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This thesis examines the impact information technologies have had on the age-old phenomenon
of terrorism. It looks at how terrorism has evolved into what has come to be known as
information terrorism over this Information Era.
Information revolution has introduced a new paradigm called Information Warfare for conflict
among nations based upon attacking information infrastructures. The political attractions and
deterrents to using these new information warfare methods are discussed at great length.
The information age is affecting not only the types of targets and weapons terrorist choose, but
also the ways in which such groups operate and structure their organizations. This paper will
discuss how several of the dangerous terrorist organizations today are using information
technology such as computers, software, telecommunication devices, and the Internet - to
better organize and coordinate dispersed activities. Like the large numbers ofprivate corporations
that have embraced IT to operate more efficiently and with greater flexibility, terrorists are
harnessing the power of IT to enable new operational doctrines and forms of organization.
The final chapters offer prescriptions and solutions for integrating information technology into
the framework of the United
States'
grand strategy to decrease the security threat and facilitate
international cooperation in this area.
Terrorism 2
Introduction
A decade ago or so ago, terrorism was a rather distinct entity on the spectrum of conflict,
with its
own unique attributes. Today it seems increasingly connectedwith broader trends in irregular
warfare, especially as waged by non-state actors.
Today's main threat to many states, including specifically the United States, no longer comes
from other states. Instead it comes from small groups and other organizations, which are not
states.
Terrorist experts have been warning that the phenomenon of terrorism is growingworse (Arquilla
& Ronefeldt, 1997). Terrorism is not a fixed phenomenon, its perpetrators adapt it to suit their
times and situations. What changes is the conduct of terrorism - the operational characteristics
built around themotivations and rationales? In this age of Information revolution, the use of
information technology (IT) has become more appealing to these groups.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 carnage in the United States, it is now widely reported
that the terrorists used high-tech tools to plan and consummate their reprehensible attacks. The
irony of it all is that the high-tech tools they used are the very same tools we use to enhance our
lives. Yes, they used common tools such as mobile phones, e-mail, the Internet.
Our transition into the Information Age has come with a series of threats to our nation's security.
The new technological developments that have occurred during the last two decades have shifted
the conception ofnational security to a great extent. Today nations face the danger of a physical
damage but also having their information infrastructures destroyed, altered, or incapacitated by
the new genre of offensive technologies. Hence there is the need to incorporate these
vulnerabilities while designing the military strategy. This thesis will discuss the different
information technology tools that are being used by terrorist organizations today and the need for
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us to examine the level of threat posed by new technology and how it has affected the entire
world's political scenario. This thesis provides a brief introduction to terrorism and how it has
evolved over the years and then moves onto the ways in which information technologies have
been utilized today by these terrorist groups to threaten the national security ofdifferent
countries. The paper also discusses how information technology can be deployed in an effective
manner to assist in countering terrorism (Devost, 2001).
There is a great need for extensive research in this area. Thework done in the political science
field to examine security issues related to information technology has beenminimal. David
Ronfeldt reports in his RAND article thatwith few exceptions, policymakers and analysts are
just beginning to discern how government and politics may ultimately be affected by the
information revolution.(Arquilla& Ronefeldt, 1997)
As a result, this thesis draws from a wide range ofmaterial that has been taken from the
information technology as well as the political science field and puts it all together reveal national
security vulnerabilities posed by the very same technologies we depend on a daily basis.
This paper discusses in detail how the transition into the Information Era proves to be
advantageous for terrorist organizations by posing as both a tool as well as a target for their
attacks.
It has been reported that, within hours of the attacks on theWorld Trade Center and the
Pentagon, U.S. intelligence was able to pick up phone calls made to the mobile phones of
suspected terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden. Callers were congratulating the terrorists for the
successful consummation of their dastardly attacks.
The terrorists reportedly used the Internet as well. They used the free and easy-to-use e-mail
personal accounts on Yahoo and Hotmail. It has also been found that terrorists conduct their
meetings in the chat rooms available on Yahoo and Hotmail (Yam, 2001).
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The terrorists reportedly practiced their aeronautical skills by flying into the virtualWorld Trade
Center towers usingMicrosoft's Flight Simulator software. The terrorists trained by practicing on
these computer-powered flight simulators that allowed them to experience flying a 767
commercial airplane over theManhattan skyline(Yam, 2001).
Arquilla and Ronfeldt state that Information Revolution is reshaping the spectrum of terrorism
across the world. First, the Information Revolution is favoring and strengthening network forms
of organization, often giving them an advantage over hierarchical forms. The rise ofnetwork
forms means that power is migrating to non-state actors who are able to organize into sprawling
multi-organizational networks more readily than can traditional, hierarchical, state actors. Non
state actor's networks are thought to be more flexible and responsive than hierarchies in reacting
to outside developments. Second, as the information revolution deepens, conflicts will
increasingly depend on informationmatters. More than ever before, conflicts will revolve around
"knowledge"





- that is, media-oriented measures that aim to attract rather than coerce
and that affect how secure a society, amilitary or other actor feels about its knowledge.
IT offers new opportunities to terrorists. A terrorist organization can reap low-risk, highly visible
payoffs by attacking information systems. As technology becomes more cost effective to
terrorists -that is availability and potential for disruptive effects rise while its financial and other
costs go down - terrorists are becoming more technologically oriented in tactics and strategies.
Indeed, we are dazzled with breathless prophecies of social progress through breakthrough
technologies. The flipside is thatwith these breakthroughs, we shall also experience technological
change.
Today, we find ourselves in a deadly duel with the technological juggernaut, whose powers
ironically threaten to annihilate those who created it.
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And so, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 carnage, we need to ask ourselves: Have we




As cited by Patrick Galley in his article on "Computer Terrorism: What are the risks?", term
"terrorism"
was used by the philosopher Emmanuel Kant for the first time in 1798, to describe a
pessimistic view of the destiny ofhumanity (Galley, 1996). The same year, it was found in one
finds the term in a supplement to the large Dictionary of the French Academy. However terrorism
then did not meanwhat it accords for today. The FBI defines
,
"Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance ofpolitical or social objectives. (Terrorism Research
Center,2000)"
There are several other definitions available and some are as follows:




"Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat ofviolence against persons or property to further political
or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or
groups, or to modify their behavior or
politics."
as defined by the Vice-President's Task Force in
1986. (Terrorism Research Center,2000)
The systematic use ofviolence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to
bring about a particular political objective. Terrorism has been practiced by political
organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and religious groups, by
revolutionaries, and even by state institutions such as armies, intelligence (Britannica.com).
It is advisable to add to these definitions, the use of terrorism as a means ofpressure. In the case
of international terrorism, the attacks are generally used to create pressure on a government by
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means ofpublic opinion, in order to obtain something precise such as the release of a prisoner or
stopping the export ofweapons to a certain country.
Forms of terrorism
There are various forms of terrorism. Luigi Bonanate as cited by Galley (Galley, 1996)
distinguished internal terrorism and international terrorism.
Internal terrorism: Terrorism of state (terror) and revolutionary terrorism comes under this form.
Here terrorism is an act of reinforcing or ofdestroying the state. The State can use the terrorism
of State to destabilize terrorist or extremist actionswith an aim of reinforcing the central
authority. The State can be an originator of terror during a war when it orders air strikes in order
to frighten its enemy or to definitively discourage it as it took place during the Second WorldWar
at Hiroshima.
International Terrorism: Firstly, comes independence or separatist terrorism, which are
movements that are carried out to fight against a colonial domination or for an independent State
or sometimes to link itself to another State than that to which they belong. Bonanate says, by
nature, independence terrorism is always international, because it carries its acts beyond the
borders of the concerned territory as is the case with Palestinian terrorism. On the other hand,
colonialist terrorism is observed aim at the preservation of the sovereignty of a State on a colony.
The LON (LeagueOfNations) soon after the attack against the king ofYugoslavia and the
Frenchminister Louis Barthou drew up an International Convention, which was signed in Geneva
onNovember 16 1937, by twenty-five countries (except Italy and the United States). This
convention defined the terrorist acts as "criminal facts directed against a State and ofwhich the
goal or nature is to cause terror towards determined personalities, groups ofpeople or the
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population"
.The signatories of the text thus drew up the detailed list of the various forms of
terrorism (Galley, 1996):
Facts intentionally directed against the life, the physical integrity, health or freedom of:
heads of States, people who exert the prerogatives ofhead of State, their hereditary or
designated successors; husband or wife of the above peoples;
Invested people of functions or public offices when the above-mentioned fact was made
because of the functions or the responsibilities which these people exert.
The fact of destroying or of intentionally damaging public goods or goods intended for a
public use, which belong to another State signatory or which belong to the State.
The fact of intentionally endangering human lives in order to create a common danger.
The fact ofmanufacturing, ofgetting, ofholding or ofproviding weapons, ammunition,
explosive products or harmful substances for the execution, in any country, of an
infringement (Cryan, 2001).
Evolution of International terrorism
In July 1995, he tenth annual International Conference on Criminal Justice Issue (Hoffman,
1999), brought to attentionwith the help ofexperts that there is high probability of the use of
Weapons ofMass Destruction in the future. It was also reported, the ethnic or religious terrorist
groups will not hesitate to use such weapons that would cause a great number ofvictims, whereas
the fearing ofpopular support would keep old terrorist groups from using such weapons. It was
seen from the attack with toxic gas, in Japan, the taboo ofusing chemical weapons was broken.
Past terrorist attacks as enlisted by the United States Embassy on October
8th, 2001
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First U.S. Aircraft Hijacked, May 1, 1961: Puerto Rican bornAntuilo Ramierez Ortiz forced at
gunpoint aNational Airlines plane to fly to Havana, Cuba, where he was given asylum
(terrorism.com).
Ambassador to Guatemala Assassinated, August 28, 1968: U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John
Gordon Mein was murdered by a rebel faction when gunmen forced his official car off the road in
Guatemala City and raked the vehicle with gunfire.
Ambassador to Japan Attacked, July 30, 1969: U.S. Ambassador to Japan A.H. Meyer was
attacked by a knife-wielding Japanese citizen.
Ambassador to Brazil Kidnapped, September 3, 1969: U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Charles Burke
Elbrick was kidnapped by theMarxist revolutionary groupMR-8.
U.S. Agency for International Development AdviserKidnapped, July 31, 1970: InMontevideo,
Uruguay, the Tupamaros terrorist group kidnappedUSAJD Police adviserDanMitrione; his body
was found on August 10.
"Bloody
Friday,"
July 21,1972: An Irish RepublicanArmy (IRA) bomb attacks killed 1 1 people
and injured 130 in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Ten days later, three IRA car bomb attacks in the
village ofClaudy left six dead.
Munich OlympicMassacre, September 5, 1972: Eight Palestinian "Black
September"
terrorists
seized 1 1 Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village inMunich,West Germany. In a bungled rescue
attempt byWest German authorities, nine of the hostages and five terrorists were killed.
Ambassador to SudanAssassinated,March 2, 1973: U.S. Ambassador to Sudan Cleo A. Noel and
other diplomats were assassinated at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum bymembers of the
Black September organization.
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Consul General in Mexico Kidnapped, May 4, 1973: U.S. Consul General in Guadalajara
Terrence Leonhardy was kidnapped bymembers of the People's RevolutionaryArmed Forces.
Domestic Terrorism, January 27-29, 1975: Puerto Rican nationalists bombed aWall Street bar,
killing four and injuring 60; 2 days later, theWeatherUnderground claims responsibility for an
explosion in a bathroom at the U.S. Department of State in Washington.
Entebbe Hostage Crisis, June 27, 1976: Members of the Baader-MeinhofGroup and the Popular
Front for the Liberation ofPalestine (PFLP) seized anAir France airliner and its 258 passengers.
They forced the plane to land in Uganda, where on July 3 Israeli commandos successfully rescued
the passengers.
Assassination ofFormer ChileanDiplomat, September 21, 1976: InWashington, exiled Chilean
Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier was killed by a car bomb.
Kidnapping of Italian PrimeMinister,March 16, 1978: PremierAldoMoro was seized by the
Red Brigade and assassinated 55 days later.
Iran Hostage Crisis, November 4, 1979: After President Carter agreed to admit the Shah of Iran
into theU.S., Iranian radicals seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American
diplomats hostage. Thirteen hostages were soon released, but the remaining 53 were held until
their release on January 20, 1 98 1 .
GrandMosque Seizure, November 20, 1979: 200 Islamic terrorists seized the Grand Mosque in
Mecca, Saudi Arabia, taking hundreds ofpilgrims hostage. Saudi and French security forces
retook the shrine after an intense battle in which some 250 people were killed and 600 wounded.
U.S. Installation Bombing, August 31, 1981: The Red Army exploded a bomb at the U.S. Air
Force Base at Ramstein,West Germany.
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Assassination ofEgyptian President, October 6, 1981: Soldiers who were secretlymembers of the
TakfirWal-Hajira sect attacked and killed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during a troop review.
Murder ofMissionaries, December 4, 1981: Three American nuns and one laymissionary were
foundmurdered outside San Salvador, El Salvador. Theywere believed to have been assassinated
by a right-wing death squad.
Assassination ofLebanese PrimeMinister, September 14, 1982: Premier Bashir Gemayel was
assassinated by a car bomb parked outside his party's Beirut headquarters.
ColombianHostage-taking, April 8, 1983: AU.S. citizen was seized by the RevolutionaryArmed
Forces ofColombia (FARC) and held for ransom.
Bombing ofU.S. Embassy in Beirut, April 18, 1983: Sixty-three people, including the CIA's
Middle East director, were killed, and 120 were injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb attack
on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.
Naval OfficerAssassinated in El Salvador, May 25, 1983: AU.S. Navy officer was assassinated
by the FarabundoMartiNational Liberation Front.
North Korean Hit Squad, October 9, 1983: North Korean agents blew up a delegation from South
Korea in Rangoon, Burma, killing 21 persons and injuring 48.
Bombing ofMarine Barracks, Beirut, October 23, 1983: Simultaneous suicide truck-bomb attacks
were made on American and French compounds in Beirut, Lebanon. A 12,000-pound bomb
destroyed the U.S. compound, killing 242 Americans, while 58 French troops were killedwhen a
400-pound device destroyed a French base. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.
Naval Officer Assassinated in Greece, November 15, 1983: A U.S. Navy officer was shot by the
November 17 terrorist group in Athens, Greece, while his car was stopped at a traffic light.
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Kidnapping ofEmbassy Official, March 16, 1984: The Islamic Jihad kidnapped and later
murdered Political OfficerWilliam Buckley inBeirut, Lebanon. OtherU.S. citizens not
connected to the U.S. Government were seized over a succeeding 2-year period.
Hizballah Restaurant Bombing, April 12, 1984: EighteenU.S. servicemenwere killed, and 83
people were injured in a bomb attack on a restaurant near aU.S. Air Force Base in Torrejon,
Spain. Responsibility was claimed by Hizballah.
Golden Temple Seizure, June 5, 1984: Sikh terrorists seized the Golden Temple in Amritsar,
India. One hundred people died when Indian security forces retook the Sikh holy shrine.
Assassination ofPrime Minister Gandhi, October 31, 1984: The Indian premier was shot to death
by members ofher security force.
Kidnapping ofU.S. Officials inMexico, February 7, 1985: Under the orders ofnarcotrafficker
Rafael Cero Quintero, Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique Camarena Salazar and
his pilot were kidnapped, tortured, and executed.
TWAHijacking, June 14, 1985: A Trans-WorldAirlines flight was hijacked en route to Rome
fromAthens by two Lebanese Hizballah terrorists and forced to fly to Beirut. The eight crew
members and 145 passengers were held for 17 days, during which one American hostage, a U.S.
Navy sailor, was murdered. After being flown twice to Algiers, the aircraft was returned to Beirut
after Israel released 435 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners.
Air India Bombing, June 23, 1985: A bomb destroyed anAir India Boeing 747 over the Atlantic,
killing all 329 people aboard. Both Sikh and Kashmiri terrorists were blamed for the attack. Two
cargo handlers were killed at Tokyo airport, Japan, when another Sikh bomb exploded in anAir
Canada aircraft enroute to India.
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Soviet Diplomats Kidnapped, September 30, 1985: In Beirut, Lebanon, Sunni terrorists
kidnapped four Soviet diplomats. One was killed, but three were later released.
Achille Lauro Hijacking, October 7, 1985: Four Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists seized the
Italian cruise liner in the easternMediterranean Sea, taking more than 700 hostages. One U.S.




Egyptian AirlinerHijacking, November 23, 1985: An Egypt Air airplane bound from Athens to
Malta and carrying several U.S. citizens was hijacked by the AbuNidal Group.
Aircraft Bombing in Greece, March 30, 1986: A Palestinian splinter group detonated a bomb as
TWA Flight 840 approached Athens Airport, killing fourU.S. citizens.
Berlin Discoteque Bombing, April 5, 1986: Two U.S. soldiers were killed, and 79 American
servicemen were injured in a Libyan bomb attack on a nightclub inWest Berlin,West Germany.
In retaliation, U.S. military jets bombed targets in and around Tripoli and Benghazi.
Kimpo Airport Bombing, September 14, 1986: NorthKorean agents detonated an explosive
device at Seoul's Kimpo Airport, killing five persons and injuring 29 others.
Bus Attack, April 24, 1987: Sixteen U.S. servicemen riding in a Greek Air Force bus nearAthens
were injured in an apparent bombing attack, carried out by the revolutionary organization known
as 17 November.
Downing ofAirliner, November 29, 1987: North Korean agents planted a bomb aboardKorean
Air Lines Flight 858, which subsequently crashed into the Indian Ocean.
Servicemen's Bar Attack, December 26, 1987: Catalan separatists bombed a Barcelona bar
frequented byU.S. servicemen, resulting in the death of one U.S. citizen.
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Kidnapping ofWilliam Higgins, February 17, 1988: U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. W. Higgins was
kidnapped and murdered by the Iranian-backed Hizballah group while serving with the United
Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in southern Lebanon.
Naples USO Attack, April 14, 1988: The Organization of Jihad Brigades exploded a car bomb
outside a USO Club inNaples, Italy, killing one U.S. sailor.
Attack on U.S. Diplomat in Greece, June 28, 1988: The Defense Attache of the U.S. Embassy in
Greece was killedwhen a car bomb was detonated outside his home in Athens.
Pan Am 103 Bombing, December 21, 1988: Pan American Airlines Flight 103 was blown up over
Lockerbie, Scotland, by a bomb believed to have been placed on the aircraft in Frankfurt,West
Germany, by Libyan terrorists. All 259 people on board were killed.
Assassination ofU.S. Army Officer, April 21, 1989: The New People's Army (NPA) assassinated
Col. James Rowe inManila. TheNPA also assassinated two U.S. government defense contractors
in September.
Assassination ofGerman Bank Chairman, November 30, 1989: The RedArmy assassinated
Deutsche Bank ChairmanAlfredHerrhausen in Frankfurt.
U.S. EmbassyBombed in Peru, January 15, 1990: The Tupac Amaru RevolutionaryMovement
bombed the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru.
U.S. Soldiers Assassinated in the Philippines, May 13, 1990: The New People's Army (NPA)
killed two U.S. Air Force personnel near Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.
Attempted Iraqi Attacks onU.S. Posts, January 1 8-19, 1991 : Iraqi agents planted bombs at the
U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia's home residence and at the USIS library in Manila.
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Kidnapping ofU.S. Businessmen in the Philippines, January 17-21, 1992: A senior official of the
corporation Philippine Geothermal was kidnapped in Manila by the Red Scorpion Group, and two
U.S. businessmen were seized independently by the National LiberationArmy and by
Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC).
Bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina, March 17, 1992: Hizballah claimed responsibility
for a blast that leveled the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, causing the deaths of29
andwounding 242.
Kidnappings ofU.S. Citizens in Colombia, January 31, 1993: RevolutionaryArmed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) terrorists kidnapped three U.S. missionaries.
World Trade CenterBombing, February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center in New York City
was badly damagedwhen a car bomb planted by Islamic terrorists explodes in an underground
garage. The bomb left six people dead and 1,000 injured. The men carrying out the attack were
followers ofOmarAbd al-Rahman, an Egyptian cleric who preached in theNew York City area.
Attempted Assassination ofPresident Bush by Iraqi Agents, April 14, 1993: The Iraqi
intelligence service attempted to assassinate formerU.S. President George Bush during a visit to
Kuwait. In retaliation, the U.S. launched a cruise missile attack 2 months later on the Iraqi capital
Baghdad.
HebronMassacre, February 25, 1994: Jewish right-wing extremist and U.S. citizenBaruch
Goldsteinmachine-gunnedMoslem worshippers at a mosque inWest Bank town ofHebron,
killing 29 andwounding about 150.
FARC Hostage-taking, September 23, 1994: FARC rebels kidnappedU.S. citizen Thomas
Hargrove in Colombia.
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Air France Hijacking, December 24, 1994: Members of the Armed Islamic Group seized anAir
France Flight to Algeria. The four terrorists were killed during a rescue effort.
Attack onU.S. Diplomats in Pakistan,March 8, 1995: Two unidentified gunmen killed two U.S.
diplomats and wounded a third inKarachi, Pakistan.
Tokyo Subway Station Attack, March 20, 1995: Twelve persons were killed, and 5,700 were
injured in a Sarin nerve gas attack on a crowded subway station in the center ofTokyo, Japan. A
similar attack occurred nearly simultaneously in the Yokohama subway system. The Aum
Shinri-
kyu cult was blamed for the attacks.
Bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995: Right-wing extremists
TimothyMcVeigh and TerryNichols destroyed the Federal Building in Oklahoma Citywith a
massive truck bomb that killed 166 and injured hundreds more in what was up to then the largest
terrorist attack on American soil.
Kashmiri Hostage-taking, July 4, 1995: In India, six foreigners, including two U.S. citizens, were
taken hostage byAl-Faran, a Kashmiri separatist group. One non-U.S. hostage was later found
beheaded.
JerusalemBus Attack, August 21 , 1995 : Hamas claimed responsibility for the detonation of a
bomb that killed six and injured over 100 persons, including several U.S. citizens.
Attack onU.S. Embassy inMoscow, September 13, 1995: A rocket-propelled grenade was fired
through the window of the U.S. Embassy inMoscow, ostensibly in retaliation forU.S. strikes on
Serb positions in Bosnia.
SaudiMilitary InstallationAttack, November 13, 1995: The
Islamic Movement ofChange
planted a bomb in aRiyadh military compound that killed one U.S. citizen, several foreign
national employees of the U.S. Government, and more than 40 others.
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Egyptian EmbassyAttack, November 19, 1995: A suicide bomber drove a vehicle into the
Egyptian Embassy compound in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing at least 16 and injuring 60 persons.
Three militant Islamic groups claimed responsibility.
PapuanHostage Abduction, January 8, 1996: In Indonesia, 200 Free PapuaMovement (OPM)
guerrillas abducted 26 individuals in the Lorenta nature preserve, Irian Jaya Province. Indonesian
Special Forces members rescued the remaining nine hostages onMay 15.
Kidnapping in Colombia, January 19, 1996: RevolutionaryArmed Forces ofColombia (FARC)
guerrillas kidnapped aU.S. citizen and demanded a $1 million ransom. The hostage was released
onMay 22.
Tamil Tigers Attack, January 31, 1996: Members of the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam
(LTTE) rammed an explosives-laden truck into the Central Bank in the heart of downtown
Colombo, Sri Lanka, killing 90 civilians and injuringmore than 1,400 others, including two U.S.
citizens.
IRA Bombing, February 9, 1996: An Irish RepublicanArmy (IRA) bomb detonated in London,
killing two persons andwoundingmore than 100 others, including two U.S. citizens.
Athens Embassy Attack, February 15, 1996: Unidentified assailants fired a rocket at the U.S.
embassy compound in Athens, causing minor damage to
three diplomatic vehicles and some
surrounding buildings.
Circumstances of the attack suggested it was an operation carried out by
the 17 November group.
ELN Kidnapping, February 16, 1996: Six allegedNational LiberationArmy (ELN) guerrillas
kidnapped aU.S. citizen in Colombia. After 9 months, the hostage was released.
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Hamas Bus Attack, February 26, 1996: In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber blew up a bus, killing 26
persons, including three U.S. citizens, and injuring some 80 persons, including three otherUS
citizens.
DizengoffCenter Bombing, March 4, 1996: Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PU) both
claimed responsibility for a bombing outside ofTel Aviv's largest shoppingmall that killed 20
persons and injured 75 others, including two U.S. citizens.
West Bank Attack, May 13, 1996: Arab gunmen opened fire on a bus and a group ofYeshiva
students near the Bet El settlement, killing a dual U.S.-Israeli citizen andwounding three Israelis.
No one claimed responsibility for the attack, but Hamas was suspected.
USAID Worker Abduction,May 31, 1996: A gang of former Contra guerrillas kidnapped a U.S.
employee of theAgency for International Development (USAID) who was assistingwith election
preparations in rural northernNicaragua. She was released unharmed the next day after members
of the international commission overseeing the preparations intervened.
Zekharya Attack, June 9, 1996: Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a car near Zekharya, killing
a dual U.S./Israeli citizen and an Israeli. The Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine (PFLP)
is suspected.
Manchester Truck Bombing, June 15, 1996: An IRA truck bomb detonated at aManchester
shopping center, wounding 206 persons, including two German tourists, and caused extensive
property damage.
Khobar Towers Bombing, June 25, 1996: A fuel truck carrying a bomb exploded outside the U.S.
military's Khobar Towers housing facility in Dhahran, killing 19 U.S. military personnel and
wounding 515 persons, including 240 U.S. personnel. Several groups claimed responsibility for
the attack.
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ETABombing, July 20, 1996: A bomb exploded at Tarragona International Airport in Reus,
Spain, wounding 35 persons, including British and Irish tourists. The Basque Fatherland and
Liberty (ETA) organization was suspected.
Bombing ofArchbishop ofOran, August 1, 1996: A bomb exploded at the home of the French
Archbishop ofOran, killing him and his chauffeur. The attack occurred after the Archbishop's
meeting with the French Foreign Minister. TheAlgerianArmed Islamic Group (GIA) is
suspected.
Sudanese Rebel Kidnapping, August 17, 1996: Sudan People's LiberationArmy (SPLA) rebels
kidnapped six missionaries inMapourdit, including aU.S. citizen, an Italian, three Australians,
and a Sudanese. The SPLA released the hostages 1 1 days later.
PUK Kidnapping, September 13, 1996: In Iraq, Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK) militants
kidnapped four French workers for Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres, a Canadian United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) official, and two Iraqis.
Assassination of South Korean Consul, October 1, 1996: In Vladivostok, Russia, assailants
attacked and killed a SouthKorean consul near his home. No one claimed responsibility, but
SouthKorean authorities believed that the attack was carried out by professionals and that the
assailants were North Koreans. North Korean officials denied the country's involvement in the
attack.
Red Cross Worker Kidnappings, November 1, 1996: In Sudan, a breakaway group from the
Sudanese People's LiberationArmy (SPLA) kidnapped three International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) workers, including aU.S. citizen, an Australian, and aKenyan. OnDecember 9,
the rebels released the hostages in exchange for ICRC supplies and a health survey for their
camp.
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Paris Subway Explosion, December 3, 1996: A bomb exploded aboard a Paris subway train as it
arrived at the Port Royal station, killing two French nationals, aMoroccan, and a Canadian, and
injuring 86 persons. Among those injured were one U.S. citizen and a Canadian. No one claimed
responsibility for the attack, butAlgerian extremists are suspected.
Abduction ofUS. Citizen by FARC, December 11, 1996: Five armedmen claiming to be
members of the RevolutionaryArmed Forces ofColombia (FARC) kidnapped and later killed a
U.S. geologist at a methane gas exploration site in La Guajira Department.
Tupac Amaru Seizure ofDiplomats, December 17, 1996: Twenty-three members of the Tupac
Amaru RevolutionaryMovement (MRTA) took several hundred people hostage at a party given
at the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru. Among the hostages were severalU.S.
officials, foreign ambassadors and other diplomats, Peruvian Government officials, and Japanese
businessmen. The group demanded the release of allMRTAmembers in prison and safe passage
for them and the hostage takers. The terrorists released most of the hostages in December but held
81 Peruvians and Japanese citizens for several months.
Egyptian Letter Bombs, January 2-13, 1997: A series of letter bombs with Alexandria, Egypt,
postmarks were discovered at Al-Hayat newspaper bureaus inWashington, New York City,
London, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Three similar devices, also postmarked in Egypt, were found
at a prison facility in Leavenworth, Kansas. Bomb disposal
experts defused all the devices, but one detonated at the Al-Hayat office in London, injuring two
security guards and causing minor damage.
Tajik Hostage Abductions, February 4-17, 1997: NearKomsomolabad, Tajikistan, a paramilitary
group led byBakhrom Sodirov abducted fourUnited Nations military observers. The victims
included two Swiss, one Austrian, one Ukrainian, and their Tajik interpreter. The kidnappers
demanded safe passage for their supporters fromAfghanistan to Tajikistan. In four separate
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incidents occurring between Dushanbe and Garm, Bakhrom Sodirov and his group kidnapped two
International Committee for the Red Cross members, four Russian journalists and their Tajik
driver, fourUNHCRmembers, and the Tajik SecurityMinister, Saidamir Zukhurov.
Venezuelan Abduction, February 14, 1997: Six armed Colombian guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. oil
engineer and his Venezuelan pilot inApure, Venezuela. The kidnappers released the Venezuelan
pilot on February 22. According to authorities, the FARC is responsible for the kidnapping.
Empire State Building SniperAttack, February 23, 1997: A Palestinian gunman opened fire on
tourists at an observation deck atop the Empire State Building inNew York City, killing aDanish
national andwounding visitors from theUnited States, Argentina, Switzerland, and France before
turning the gun on himself. A handwritten note carried
by the gunman claimed this was a punishment attack against the "enemies of
Palestine."
ELN Kidnapping, February 24, 1997: National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas kidnapped a
U.S. citizen employed by a Las Vegas gold corporation who was scouting a goldmining
operation in Colombia. The ELN demanded a ransom of $2.5 million.
FARC Kidnapping, March 7, 1997: FARC guerrillas kidnapped aU.S. mining employee and his
Colombian colleague who were searching for gold in Colombia. On November 16, the rebels
released the two hostages after receiving a $50,000 ransom.
Hotel Nacional Bombing, July 12, 1997: A bomb exploded at the Hotel Nacional in Havana,
injuring three persons and causing minor damage. A previously unknown group calling itself the
Military Liberation Union claimed responsibility.
Israeli ShoppingMall Bombing, September 4, 1997: Three suicide bombers ofHamas detonated
bombs in the Ben Yehuda shopping mall in Jerusalem, killing eight persons, including the
Terrorism 22
bombers, andwounding nearly 200 others. A dual U.S./Israeli citizen was among the dead, and
sevenU.S. citizens were wounded.
OAS Abductions, October 23, 1997: In Colombia, ELN rebels kidnapped two foreignmembers of
the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) and a Colombian human rights official at a
roadblock. The ELN claimed that the kidnappingwas intended "to show the international
community that the elections in Colombia are a
farce."
Yemeni Kidnappings, October 30, 1997: Al-Sha'if tribesmen kidnapped aU.S. businessman near
Sanaa. The tribesmen sought the release of two fellow tribesmen who were arrested on smuggling
charges and several public works projects they claim the government promised them. They
released the hostage onNovember 27.
Murder ofU.S. Businessmen in Pakistan, November 12, 1997: Two unidentified gunmen shot to
death fourU.S. auditors fromUnion Texas Petroleum Corporation and their Pakistani driver after
they drove away from the SheratonHotel inKarachi. The Islami Inqilabi Council, or Islamic
Revolutionary Council, claimed responsibility in a call to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. In a
letter to Pakistani newspapers, the Aimal Khufia Action Committee also claimed responsibility.
Tourist Killings in Egypt, November 17, 1997: Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) gunmen shot and
killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians and wounded 26 others at the Hatshepsut Temple in the
Valley of the Kings near Luxor. Thirty-four Swiss, eight Japanese, five Germans, fourBritons,
one French, one Colombian, a dual Bulgarian/British citizen, and four unidentified persons were
among the dead. Twelve Swiss, two Japanese, two Germans, one French, and nine Egyptians
were among the wounded.
UN ObserverAbductions, February 19, 1998: Armed supporters of late Georgian President Zviad
Gamsakhurdia abducted fourUNmilitary observers from Sweden, Uruguay, and the Czech
Republic.
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FARC Abduction, March 21-23, 1998: FARC rebels kidnapped a U.S. citizen in Sabaneta,
Colombia. FARC members also killed three persons, wounded 14, and kidnapped at least 27
others at a roadblock near Bogota. FourU.S. citizens and one Italian were among those
kidnapped, as well as the acting president of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and his wife.
Somali Hostage-takings, April 15, 1998: Somali militiamen abducted nine Red Cross and Red
Crescent workers at an airstrip north ofMogadishu. The hostages included a U.S. citizen, a
German, a Belgian, a French, aNorwegian, two Swiss, and one Somali. The gunmen were
members of a sub clan loyal to Ali MahdiMohammed, who controlled the northern section of the
capital.
IRA Bombing, Banbridge, August 1, 1998: A 500-pound car bomb planted by the Real IRA
exploded outside a shoe store in Banbridge, North Ireland, injuring 35 persons and damaging at
least 200 homes.
U.S. EmbassyBombings in East Africa, August 7, 1998: A bomb exploded at the rear entrance of
the U.S. embassy inNairobi, Kenya, killing 12 U.S. citizens, 32 Foreign Service Nationals
(FSNs), and 247 Kenyan citizens. About 5,000 Kenyans, six U.S. citizens, and 13 FSNs were
injured. The U.S. embassy building sustained extensive structural damage. Almost
simultaneously, a bomb detonated outside the U.S. embassy inDar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing
seven FSNs and three Tanzanian citizens, and injuring one U.S. citizen and 76 Tanzanians. The
explosion causedmajor structural damage to the U.S. embassy facility. The U.S. Government
held Osama Bin Laden responsible.
IRABombing, Omagh, August 15, 1998: A 500-pound car bomb planted by the Real IRA
exploded outside a local courthouse in the central shopping district ofOmagh, Northern Ireland,
killing 29 persons and injuring over 330.
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Colombian Pipeline Bombing, October 18, 1998: A National LiberationArmy (ELN) planted
bomb exploded on the Ocensa pipeline in Antioquia Department, killing approximately 71
persons and injuring at least 100 others. The pipeline is jointly owned by the Colombia State Oil
Company Ecopetrol and a consortium, including U.S., French, British, and Canadian companies.
ArmedKidnapping in Colombia, November 15, 1998: Armed assailants followed aU.S.
businessman and his family home in CundinamarcaDepartment and kidnapped his 1 1 -year-old
son after stealingmoney, jewelry, one automobile, and two cell phones. The kidnappers
demanded $1 million in ransom. On January 21, 1999, the kidnappers released the boy.
Angolan Aircraft Downing, January 2, 1999: AUN plane carrying one U.S. citizen, four
Angolans, two Philippine nationals, and oneNamibian was shot down, according to a UN
official. No deaths or injuries were reported. Angolan authorities blamed the attack on
National Union for the Total Independence ofAngola (UNITA) rebels. UNtTA officials denied
shooting down the plane.
Ugandan Rebel Attack, February 14, 1999: A pipe bomb exploded inside a bar, killing five
persons and injuring 35 others. One Ethiopian and fourUgandan nationals died in the blast, and
one U.S. citizenworking forUSAID, two Swiss nationals, one Pakistani, one Ethiopian, and 27
Ugandans were injured. Ugandan authorities blamed the attack on the Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF).
Greek Embassy Seizure, February 16, 1999: Kurdish protesters stormed and occupied the Greek
Embassy in Vienna, taking the GreekAmbassador and six other people as hostage. Several hours
later the protesters released the hostages and left the embassy. The attack followed the Turkish




Party (PKK) leaderAbdullah Ocalan. Kurds also occupiedKenyan, Israeli,
and otherGreek diplomatic facilities in France, Holland, Switzerland, Britain, andGermany over
the following days.
FARC Kidnappings, February 25, 1999: FARC kidnapped three U.S. citizens working for the
Hawaii-based Pacific Cultural Conservancy International. OnMarch 4, the bodies of the three
victims were found in Venezuela.
Hutu Abductions,March 1, 1999: 150 armed Hutu rebels attacked three tourist camps inUganda,
killed fourUgandans, and abducted three U.S. citizens, six Britons, three New Zealanders, two
Danish citizens, one Australian, and one Canadian national. Two of the U.S. citizens and six of
the other hostages were subsequently killed by their abductors.
ELN Hostage-taking, March 23, 1999: Armed guerrillas kidnapped aU.S. citizen in Boyaca,
Colombia. The National LiberationArmy (ELN) claimed responsibility and demanded $400,000
ransom. On July 20, ELN rebels released the hostage unharmed following a ransom payment of
$48,000.
ELN Hostage-taking,May 30, 1999: In Cali, Colombia, armed ELNmilitants attacked a church
in the neighborhood ofCiudad Jardin, kidnapping 160 persons, including six U.S. citizens and
one French national. The rebels released approximately 80 persons, including three U.S. citizens,
later that day.
Shell Platform Bombing, June 27, 1999: In Port Harcourt, Nigeria, armed youths stormed a Shell
oil platform, kidnapping one U.S. citizen, oneNigerian national, and one Australian citizen, and
causing undetermined damage. A group calling itself "Enough is Enough in theNiger
River"
claimed responsibility. Further seizures ofoil facilities followed.
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AFRC Kidnappings, August 4, 1999: An Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) faction
kidnapped 33 UN representatives near OccraHills, Sierra Leone. The hostages included one U.S.
citizen, five British soldiers, one Canadian citizen, one representative from Ghana, one military
officer fromRussia, one officer from Kyrgyzstan, one officer from Zambia, one officer from
Malaysia, a local Bishop, two UN officials, two local journalists, and 16 Sierra Leonean
nationals.
Burmese Embassy Seizure, October 1, 1999: Burmese dissidents seized the Burmese Embassy in
Bangkok, Thailand, taking 89 persons hostage, including one U.S. citizen.
PLA Kidnapping, December 23, 1999: Colombian People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces
kidnapped a U.S. citizen in an unsuccessful ransoming effort.
Indian Airlines Airbus Hijacking, December 24, 1999: Five militants hijacked a flight bound
fromKathmandu to New Delhi carrying 189 people. The plane and its passengers were released
unharmed on December 3 1 .
Car bombing in Spain, January 27, 2000: Police officials reported unidentified individuals set fire
to a Citroen car dealership in Iturreta, causing extensive damage to the building and destroying 12
vehicles. The attack bore the hallmark of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA).
RUF Attacks onUNMission Personnel, May 1, 2000: OnMay 1 inMakeni, Sierra Leone,
RevolutionaryUnited Front (RUF) militants kidnapped at least 20 members of theUnitedNations
Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and surrounded and opened fire on a
UNAMSIL facility, according to press reports. The militants killed five UN soldiers in the attack.
RUF militants kidnapped 300 UNAMSIL peacekeepers throughout the country, according to
press reports. OnMay 15 in Foya, Liberia, the kidnappers released 139 hostages.
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OnMay 28 2000, on the Liberia and Sierra Leone border, armedmilitants released unharmed the
last of theUN peacekeepers. In Freetown, according to press reports, armed militants ambushed
two military vehicles carrying four journalists.
A Spaniard and one U.S. citizen were killed in aMay 25 2000 car bombing in Freetown for
which the RUF was probably responsible. Suspected RUF rebels also kidnapped 21 IndianUN
peacekeepers in Freetown on June 6 2000. Additional attacks by RUF on foreign personnel
followed.
Diplomatic Assassination in Greece, June 8, 2000: In Athens, Greece, two unidentified gunmen
killed British Defense Attache Stephen Saunders in an ambush. The Revolutionary Organization
17 November claimed responsibility.
ELN Kidnapping, June 27, 2000: In Bogota, Colombia, ELNmilitants kidnapped a 5-year-old
U.S. citizen and his Colombianmother, demanding an undisclosed ransom.
Kidnappings inKyrgyzstan, August 12, 2000: In the Kara-Su Valley, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan took fourU.S. citizens hostage. The Americans escaped on August 12.
Church Bombing in Tajikistan, October 1 , 2000: Unidentifiedmilitants detonated two bombs in a
Christian church inDushanbe, killing seven persons and injuring 70 others. The churchwas
founded by aKorean-bom U.S. citizen, and most of those killed and wounded were Korean. No
one claimed responsibility.
Helicopter Hijacking, October 12, 2000: In Sucumbios Province, Ecuador, a group of armed
kidnappers led by formermembers ofdefunct Colombian terrorist organization the Popular
Liberation Army (EPL), took hostage 10 employees of Spanish energy consortium REPSOL.
Those kidnapped included five U.S. citizens, one Argentine, one Chilean, oneNew Zealander,
and two French pilots who escaped 4 days later. On
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January 30, 2001, the kidnappers murderedAmerican hostage Ronald Sander. The remaining
hostages were released on February 23 following the payment of $13 million in ransom by the oil
companies.
Attack on U.S.S. Cole, October 12, 2000: In Aden, Yemen, a small dingy carrying explosives
rammed the destroyerU.S.S. Cole, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39 others. Supporters ofOsama
Bin Ladenwere suspected.
Manila Bombing, December 30, 2000: A bomb exploded in a plaza across the street from the U.S.
embassy inManila, injuring nine persons. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front was likely
responsible.
Srinagar Airport Attack, January 17, 2001: In India, six members of the Lashkar-e-Tayyba
militant group were killedwhen they attempted to seize a local airport.
BBC Studios Bombing,March 4, 2001: A car bomb exploded at midnight outside of the British
Broadcasting Corporation's main production studios in London.
ETA Bombing, March 9, 200 1 : Two policemen were killed by the explosion of a car bomb in
Hernani, Spain.
Bus Stop Bombing, April 22, 2001: Amember ofHamas detonated a bomb he was carrying near
a bus stop inKfar Siva, Israel, killing one person and injuring 60.
Tel-Aviv Nightclub Bombing, June 1 , 2001 : Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing of a
popular Israeli nightclub that caused over 140 casualties.
Hamas Restaurant Bombing, August 9, 2001 : AHamas-planted bomb detonated in a Jeruselum
pizza restaurant, killing 15 people andwoundingmore than 90.
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Terrorist Attacks onU.S. Homeland, September 1 1 , 200 1 : Two hijacked airliners crashed into the
twin towers of theWorld Trade Center. Soon thereafter, the Pentagon was struck by a third
hijacked plane. A fourth hijacked plane, suspected to be bound for a high-profile target in
Washington, crashed into a field in southern Pennsylvania. More than 5,000 U.S. citizens and
other nationals were killed as a result of these acts. President Bush and Cabinet officials indicated
that Osama Bin Laden was the prime suspect and that they considered theUnited States in a state
ofwar with international terrorism. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States formed the
Global Coalition Against Terrorism.
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Information Age Terrorism
The world as a whole has made a transition to a new age. Alvin Toffler describes this transition as
the ThirdWave, in his 1980 book of the same title. According to Toffler, the pattern of societal
development follows a series ofwaves and says that each period spans a lesser time than the
previous one. Toffler writes (Toffler, 1980):
"Until now the human race has undergone two great waves of change, each one largely
obliterating earlier cultures or civilizations and replacing themwith ways of life inconceivable to
those who came before. The First Wave ofchange - the agricultural revolution - took thousands
ofyears to play it out. The SecondWave
- the rise of industrial civilization - took amere three
hundred years. Today, history is even more accelerative, and it is likely that the ThirdWave will
sweep across history and complete itself in a few decades".
Tofflermade these predictions over fifteen years ago, and there can be seen a close relation
between the societal revolution he describes and today's Information Revolution.
In a Third Wave society, there are two general methods inwhich terroristmight employ an
attack:
i)When information technology is a target.
ii)When information technology is the tool of a larger operation.
The first method implies a terrorist would target an information system for sabotage, either,
electronic or physical, thus destroying or disrupting the information system itself and any
information infrastructure (e.g., power, communications, etc.) dependant upon the targeted
technology. The second method implies a terrorist would manipulate and exploit an information
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system, altering or stealing data, or forcing the system to perform a function forwhich it was
not
meant (such as spoofing air traffic control).
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Information Warfare
Devost in his article on "National Security in the InformationAge", says, "Informationwarfare is
about destroying information, reducing information flows, reducing the reliability of information
content, and denying access to services". As cited byDevost, author and security expertWinn
Schwartau writes (Denning,
"Information warfare is waged against industries, political spheres of influence, global economic
forces, or even against entire countries. It is the use of technology against technology; it is about
secrets and the theft of secrets; it is about turning information against its owners; it is about
denying an enemy the ability to use both his technology and his information".
Research reveals that past historical patterns reveal that there is no doubt that information warfare
is the warfare of the future. As Toffler reports, it has been observed that warfare always followed
the coarse of development in society. Science has always had a great impact onwar. Agrarian
society saw the development of the crossbow. As our scientific expedition advanced, so did the
weapons societies we used. The Industrial Revolution saw the birth of in formidable weapons
such as tanks and aeroplanes. Increased understanding led to the thought ofusing atomic and
nuclear fusion to create devastating bombs. Today, the new technologies brought by the
Information Revolution lets us cause even more damage at the comfort of our own homes. As we
move, or have alreadymoved, into the ThirdWave or Information Age ourweapons have also
naturally followed this course of transition.
The concept of information warfare, is not as new as we think it to be. The use of information
warfare can be traced back to 1912, when the British cable ship Telconia hauled up and cut the
five cables that was amajor link ofcommunication for Germany to the outside world. It can be
learned how well the British recognized the strategic significance of communications
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(information transfer) duringwartime and utilized their capabilities to hinder Germany's ability to
communicate. It can also be seen that when the United States intercepted and decrypted Japanese
communications intelligence duringwartime operations and diplomatic negotiations, the United
States was actually waging informationwarfare recognizing the importance of information
transfer.
However the importance of information in the industrial societies was not as high as it is today in
the information driven societies. Information then was just one of the valuable assets.More
importance and attention was given to the protection of industrial base. However, today's
Information age are driven solely based on information flow. As Devost states, this means that
informationwarfare poses a greater threat to national security in the InformationAge than it did
in the Industrial Age. The advantages of informationwarfare maymake it the most preferred
mode of conflict in the Information Age. General Gordon Sullivan and Colonel James Dubik state
that "To succeed against an industrial state generally requires the destruction not only of its army,
but also of the military infrastructure, resources andmanufacturing base of the total war-making
capability. Achieving victory against an information-based state will entail destroying that
country's armed forces, as well as destroying its war-making capability (whichmaywell include
industrial and information-related targets) and its information systems."(Sullivan& Dubik, 1994)
Attractions of Information Warfare
There are many political and strategic attractions to state-sponsored informationwarfare.
Low Cost
The relatively low cost and high return on your investment with information warfare techniques
when compared to conventional warfare makes itmost attractive. Steele's and Schwartau's
(Schwartau, 1994):) estimated the cost to reduce the United States to information rubble are
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incredibly cheap when compared to the cost ofconventionalmilitaryweapons. This poses a great
advantage to Third World nations and offers them the same basic capability to inflict the level of
damage on information infrastructures as Second and First World nations.
Timely and Not Location Specific
Information warfare is timely and it is not location specific. Informationwarfare can be waged
just by a single hit on the keyboard. It is waged without a warning. Denning says that, he constant
anticipation of it causes a sense ofparanoia. A single overseas call that cannot be picked up by
our radar can cause more monetary damage than a dozen planes carrying conventional bombs.
TheWorld Trade Center is a perfect example ofhow drastic the effects a damage to the
information infrastructure can be. It was reported that the damage to the flow of information,
estimated at over $1 billion (Yurcik, 1994). This proved to be more costly than the structural
damage inflicted on the building. Viruses can be imported into the United States through
information networks, telephone lines, or on simple floppy disks which do not attract the attention
ofU.S. Customs Inspectors.
Though a well planned attack on the information structure takes a long time to be developed , it
just takes amoment to . A great deal of investigationwould be required to uncover the plan of
such an attack. A low level information attack can be planned and orchestrated outside the
boundaries ofa victim nation. It makes it easier for nations who have easy access to U.S. visa to
carry out an attack that would require to breach international boundaires. However, the
September 1
1th
attack proves, a nation's boundaries are capable ofbeing breached by anyone with
malicious intent.
Anonymity
Anoymity is one of the plus points of communication in the InformationAge.Information warfare
offers this advantage to a great extent which makes it an attractive tool to terrorists who can keep
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their identity hidden. As Denning states, an anonymous attack creates two problems. Not only has
a state's national security been breached, but there is no one to hold accountable for the attack.
This also causes a havoc as the government would not know who to target when citizens demand
retribution. The government has no target. People would start blaming the government and this
would result in a political instability in the country and sometimes may also lead to the collapse
of the government.
Though computers are need in our lives on a daily basis, people seem to have lost their trust in
them. As cited by Denning,Winn Schwartau calls these conflicting feelings "binary
schizophrenia."
When used anonymously, informationwarfare plays on feelings ofbinary
schizophrenia causing insecurity and chaos. In this regard, anonymous informationwarfare is
comparable to the German blitzkrieg ofWorldWar H It makes an impact on the citizenry as well
the government. Targets can be strategically selected to generate the maximum amount ofchaos
and insecurity possible.
Minimal Loss ofHuman Life
There is minimal loss ofhuman lives within the target nation in an informationwar. This makes
information warfare techniques politically attractive to State sponsored terrorism as there is no
obligation onwaging a war thatwould cause least harm to lives. Jeff Legro states three reasons
for states to restrain from using certain weapons or means ofwarfare(Legro, 1994)
i) popular opinion vilifies certain weapons
ii) leaders believe use of such weapons would damage their domestic and international
political support
iii) states fear retaliatory attacks.
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As the level ofhuman casualties and structural damage is relatively low compared to a regular
warfare there is no reason for the public to villify the use of such a weapon. In fact, populations
would not be even aware of such an attack being waged against them until it is too late. Even, not
many people understand the methodolgy of such an attack. Therefore it is highly unlikely that
information warfare will be considered an inhumanway to pursue diplomacy by other means.
There is little reason to believe that using informationwarfare will be politically damaging to the
country that wages such an attack. And another point to be noted is the annonymity offered by
Informationwarfare assures that the identity of the aggressor will be well kept till the aggressor
wishes to disclose it.
An anonymous strike is very unlikely to be followed by a retalitory attack. Hence fear of
retaliation or escalationwill act as a deterrent to using information warfare. Allliances can be
formed strategically and nations can choose to remain neutral.
Legro gives examples to demonstrate thatmilitary culture is a strong factor in determining when
alternative or taboo forms ofwarfare will be used. Being a relatively new concept it is doubtful as
to how well it has been understood to be incorporated in the military culture. However, reports
indicate that area of information warfare has been receiving a great deal ofattention and
increased funding lately. This indicates that the military culture views informationwarfare as a
reasonable and perhaps preferable form ofwarfare in the future. It has been reported that three
branches of the United States Armed Services have publicly admitted to concentrating on
information warfare concerns (Legro, 1994). The Aerospace Daily reports that "Major advances
in information technologies are spurring the U.S. Air Force to mainstream informationwarfare
into its operations by incorporating informationwarfare into its doctrine. (USAF,
1995)"
With
Legro's thesis inmind, perhaps the military culture will accelerate the use of information warfare
as amethod ofconflict resolution. The use of informationwarfare techniques by the Allied forces
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in the GulfWar indicate that the military culture has already accepted information warfare as a
supplement to conventional military tactics(Mann, 1995).
First Strike Advantage
There is a huge first strike advantage in informationwarfare, but this is only if the aggressor aims
at unlimited destruction and chooses to remain anonymous to prevent retaliatory attcks. As stated
byDevost ,"there is a high correlation between the extent to which a nation damages its enemy's
information capabilities and their ability to respond using purely informationwarfare techniques.
A nation can execute this first strike anonymously if it so desires, thus delaying retaliation
indefinitely"(Devost, 1995).
Countries excercising the highest restraint to informationwarfare is likely to face a security
dilema because of the first strike adavnatage of information warfare.lt is possible that the first
strike advantage prevents the victim nation from even responding as the damage caused is so
tremenedous. It can be understood that the most strategic advantage ofwaging a first strike is
that the aggressor nation is always prepared for a response. Devost states that in an anarchic
international system, conflicts might escalate quickly into informationwarfare in an effort to
generate a strategic advantage over one's adversary. If conventional conflict is inevitable, then
whoever destroys their adversary's information systems first, gains a strategic advantage in battle.
OffensiveNature of Information Warfare
As information technology and computers are vulnerable by nature, there is always a high level of
difficulty and increased cost in taking defensive measures against the information systems. The
improvement of defense against an informationwar also invloves a security dilemma as
decreasing one's vulnerabilty to informationwarfare simultaneously increases the attraction of
using information warfare offensively. Devost feels that in order to neutralize the security
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dilemma presented by defensive postures, states may share defensive technologies to ensure that a
defensive equilibrium is maintained. This offers two advantages :
i) balance ofpower can be maintained among states;
ii) and reduced threat from rogue and terrorist states (Molander, Riddile &Wilson, 1 996).
Information Warfare proves Advantageous to Terrorism
The anonymity and the ability to wage war against countries with strong military operations
makes it an attarctive tool for terrorists. When waged anonymously or by non-state entities, all of
the advantages of information warfare are present but the deterrents are not. Terrorist groups care
least about economic interdependance or political support therefore, the only significant deterrent
vanishes. There is no question ofretaliation as when carried out anoymously there is no target to
retaliate.In some caese lack of technical expertise acts as amajor deterrentHowever, offensive
information warfare weapons are easily built using open source material. One of the most
important deterrent for terrorists in waging an informationwarfare is the lack ofpolicy regarding
this area. Terrorists are likely to feel that bloody bombs can create more havoc and chaos than
waging an information warfare. However, this deterrent will gradually neutralize as the military
operations are slowly recognizing the importance of its information systems, and as terrorists are
beginning to realize the extent economic damage that can be inflicted.
Legro gives three constraints thatmight have adverse influence on terrorists thatmight keep them
from restarining from pusuing information warfare.
i) No popular opinion to vilify the use ofcertain weapons ormeans ofwarfare within a
terorist organization.
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ii) Leaders of these groups or states may use these weapons to gain domestic support, and
may have little apprehension about loosing international political support since such
support is usually negligible in the first place.
iii) Terrorist oraganizations usually seek retaliation, rather than fear it, because retaliation
focuses attention on their organization and their cause (Legro, 1994).
Terroristsmay recognize that the benefits from this far exceeds the costs in utilizing a
non-
anoymous informationwarfare. It can be understood that as the knowledge of information
warfare spreads
,
the number and locality of the threats will increase as well. Mr. Schwartau
(Schwartau,1994) speaks ofcyber-civil disobedience in his bookwhichmay gradually take the
form of information terrorism. As cited byDevost ,anarchists have talked about creating
information anarchy should the commercialization of the net continue. This would again be
information terrorism in a very limited sense.
Information warfare is best averted by concentrating a major portion of resources to research on
building defensive military information systems. Information terrorism can also be prevented by




The term "cyberterrorism", was coined by Barry Collin, a senior research fellow at the Institute
for Security and Intelligence in California, in the 80's.
According to Collins,
"cyberterrorism"
refers to the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism.
Mark Pollitt, special agent for the FBI, defines cyberterrorism
as,"
the premeditated, politically
motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which
result in violence against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine
agents.Politically motivated attacks that cause serious harm, such as severe economic hardship or
sustained loss ofpower orwater, might also be characterized as cyberterrorism. (Krasavin, 2000)
TheNational Infrastructure Protection Center (NTPC) underDirectorRonaldDick, a key figure in
the government's infrastructure protection scheme, defines cyberterrorism:
"a criminal act perpetrated through computers resulting in violence, death and/or destruction, and
creating terror for the purpose of coercing a government to change its policies". (Dick, 2001)
According to Denning, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an act must fulfill two criterias:
i) a political motivation and
ii) a destructive result.
Cyber or computer attacks attacks usually satisfy only one: the motivation. It is by far too
difficult to cause a massive destruction using computers. Phone lines being cut can be annoying
and sometimes cause some insecuirty issues , however that need not be destructive. As can be
seen from the past, the most often cited cyberterrorist threat shutting down the Internet can
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also be just a major inconvenience than a mass destruction.Even most experts believe it's the
former. According to Denning very few malicious uses of technology qualify underDick's
definition ofcyberterrorism.
There have been few if any computer network attacks that meet the criteria for cyber terrorism.
The closes thing to closest thing to cyber terrorism that has occurred so far is the 1998 e-mail
bombing by the Internet Black Tigers against the SRI Lankan embassies.However, the damage
caused by the flood ofe-mail (Schwartz, 1995), for example, seems to be pale when compared to
the 240 deaths caused by the physical bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam in August of the same year.
Advantages of Cyber terrorism
As told byAvi Rubin, an AT&T Labs security expert, during his chat with the CNN, Cyber
attacks could even become a force to reckonwith in politics, at least if some communities follow
through on plans to allow voting over the Internet. All that amalicious agent would have to do is
launch amild attack that would slow down a vote-processing server enough to prevent a few
percent of the ballots from getting through in a few districts. "It's the easiest type of attack one
could possibly launch, and it could be enough to disrupt an
election,"
says Rubin.
Louis J.Freeh, Director ofFBI in his Congressional Statement 2000 on Cyber Crime (Freeh,
2000) stated,"The prospect of information warfare by foreignmilitaries against our critical
infrastructures is perhaps the greatest potential cyber threat to our national security.We know that
several foreign nations are developing information warfare doctrine, programs, and capabilities
against theUnited States or other nations. Knowing that they cannotmatch ourmilitarymight
with conventional or kinetic weapons, nations see cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures or
military operations as a way to hitwhat they perceive as America's Achilles heel
- our growing
dependence on information technology in government and commercial operations". He also
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mentions that, 'Two Chinesemilitary officers recently published a book that called for the use of
unconventional measures, including the propagation ofcomputer viruses, to counterbalance the
military power of theUnited States. And a Russian official has also commented that an attack on
a national infrastructure could, by virtue of its catastrophic consequences, completely overlap
with the use of [weapons] ofmass
destruction."
There has been little concrete evidence to prove that terrorists are preparing to use the Internet as
a venue for inflicting a massive destruction. However, in February 1998, Clark Staten, executive
director of the Emergency Response & Research Institute in Chicago, testified that "members of
some Islamic extremist organizations have been attempting to develop a hacker network to
support their computer activities and even engage in offensive informationwarfare attacks in the
future."
(Staten, 1998) The very same year, The DetroitNews, reported that Khalid Ibrahim, a
member of themilitant Indian separatist group Harkat-ul-Ansar, had tried to buymilitary
software from hackers who had stolen it fromU.S. Department ofDefense computers they had
hacked. Harkat-ul-Ansar, declaredwar on the United States attack on a suspected terrorist
training camp inAfghanistan run by Osama bin Laden, which was reported to have killed nine of
theirmembers. Ibrahim's attempt was caught when an 18-year-old hacker identifying himself as
Chameleon attempted to cash a $1,000 check from the suspected terrorist. Chameleon denied all
these charges, but it is likely that Ibrahimmay have obtained it or other sensitive information
from one of the many other hackers he approached.
Terrorists might use cracking formore than destroying data. According to Denning , an attack on
the information systems causes amajor distraction thus giving room for carrying out a physical
attack. As stated byRonefeldt, if a determined group wanted to bringNew York to its knees,
what better way than to combine a physical bombing campaignwith simultaneous IT attacks on
the power grid, hospitals, emergency services and themedia? (Ronefeldt, 1992)
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InAugust 1999, the Center for the Study ofTerrorism and IrregularWarfare at theNaval
Postgraduate School inMonterey, California, issued a report titled "Cyberterror: Prospects and
Implications.(Denning, 2000)". The study was done to evaluate the demand side of terrorism.
They assessed the prospects of terrorist organizations pursuing cyberterrorism. They concluded
that the barrier to entry for anything beyond annoying hacks is quite high, and that terrorists
generally lack the wherewithal and human capital needed to mount a meaningful operation.
Cyberterrorism, as they argued, was a thing of the future, although itmight be pursued as an
ancillary tool.
Levels of cyber terror capability
TheMonterey group defined three levels of cyberterror capability.
Simple-Unstructured: The capability to conduct basic hacks against individual systems using
tools created by someone else. The organization possesses little target analysis, command and
control, or learning capability.
Advanced-Structured: The capability to conduct more sophisticated attacks against multiple
systems or networks and possibly, to modify or create basic hacking tools. The organization
possesses an elementary target analysis, command and control, and learning capability.
Complex-Coordinated: The capability for coordinated attacks capable of causing
mass-
disruption against integrated, heterogeneous defenses (including cryptography). Ability to create
sophisticated hacking tools. Highly capable target analysis, command and control, and
organization learning capability (Devost, 1995)
CyberAttacks that have occurred in the past
As listed byDorotbryDenning in her article on "Cyberterrorism".
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In 1996, a computer hacker allegedly associated with theWhite Supremacist movement
temporarily disabled aMassachusetts ISP and damaged part of the ISP's record keeping system.
The ISP had attempted to stop the hacker from sending out worldwide racist messages under the
ISP's name. The hacker signed offwith the threat, "you have yet to see true electronic terrorism.
This is a promise."(Denning, 2000)
In 1998, Spanish protestors bombarded the Institute for Global Communications (IGC) with
thousands ofbogus e-mail messages. E-mail was tied up and undeliverable to the ISP's users, and
support lines were tied up with people who couldn't get theirmail (Ronefeldt, 1992). The
protestors also spammed IGC staff and member accounts, clogged theirWeb page with bogus
credit card orders, and threatened to employ the same tactics against organizations using IGC
services. They demanded that IGC stop hosting the web site for the Euskal Herria Journal, aNew
York-based publication supporting Basque independence. Protestors said IGC supported
terrorism because a section on theWeb pages containedmaterials on the terrorist group ETA,
which claimed responsibility for assassinations of Spanish political and security officials, and
attacks onmilitary installations. IGC finally relented and pulled the site because of the "mail
bombings."
In 1998, ethnic Tamil guerrillas swamped Sri Lankan embassies with 800 e-mails a day over a
two-week period. Themessages read "We are the Internet Black Tigers and we're doing this to
disrupt your
communications."
Intelligence authorities characterized it as the first known attack
by terrorists against a country's computer systems.
During the Kosovo conflict in 1999, NATO computers were blasted with e-mail bombs and hit
with denial-of-service attacks by hacktivists protesting the NATO bombings. In addition,
businesses, public organizations, and academic institutes received highly politicized virus-laden
e-mails from a range ofEastern European countries, according to reports.Web defacements were
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also common. After the Chinese Embassy was accidentally bombed in Belgrade, Chinese
hacktivists posted messages such as "We won't stop attacking until the war
stops!"
on U.S.
governmentWeb sites (Denning, 2000).
Since December 1997, the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) has been conductingWeb sit-
ins against various sites in support of theMexican Zapatistas. At a designated time, thousands of
protestors point their browsers to a target site using software that floods the target with rapid and
repeated download requests. EDT's software has also been used by animal rights groups against
organizations said to abuse animals. Electro hippies, another group ofhacktivists, conductedWeb
sit-ins against theWTO when theymet in Seattle in late 1999. These sit-ins all require mass
participation to have much effect, and thus are more suited to use by activists than by terrorists
(Lai, 2002).
Another example is India and Pakistan engaging in a cyber protest caused by national and ethnic
differences (Waalia, 2001). After a cease-fire in the KashmirValley hackers took it upon
themselves to continue the hostilities. In 2000, pro-Pakistani hackers defacedmore than 500
Indian web sites. Conversely, only one known Pakistani site was hacked by the Indians. This
illustrates a large difference in technical, hacking abilities or the willingness to use the skills to
strike at an adversary. In this event the apparent level of sophistication on both sides is relatively
low.Web site defacements are the leading form of this protest. The group G-Force Pakistanwas
the most active group claiming involvement in the events.
Al-Qaeda organizations Cyber Capabilities
There has been very little evidence that points to the Al-Qaeda launching cyber attacks against
critical infrastructure. Inspite of its highly sophisticated logistical and organizational capability, to
date, has launched only physical attacks that have been clearly "low-tech. There has been
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significant, reports, stating that Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization usecomputer and
telecommunication technology to a great extent on a daily basis. (Gellman, 2002)
In the wake of the September 1
1th
attacks, Osama Bin Laden reportedly gave a statement to
HamidMir (editor of the Ausafnewspaper) indicating that:
"hundreds ofyoungmen had pledged to him that they were ready to die and that hundreds of
Muslim scientists were with him and who would use their knowledge in chemistry, biology and
(sic) ranging from computers to electronics against the infidel. He said they had no atom bombs
and missiles but the passion for jihad was more important than those
weapons."
This statement clearly suggests that the most wanted terrorist of the
21st
century, Osama Bin
Laden, is threatening to use cyberterrorism against theWest. Bin
Laden'
s has financial resources,
which would enable him or his organization to purchase the equipment and expertise required for
a cyber attack and mount such an attack in very short order. Though there has been no report of
an attack directly associatedwith the Al-Qaeda organization, there has been a cycle of attacks
coming from hackers sympathetic to the cause of Islamic extremists.
Not surprisingly, foreign intelligence has adapted to using cyber tools as part of their espionage
tradecraft. Ever as far back as 1986, before the worldwide surge in the Internet use, the KGB
employedWest German hackers to access Department ofDefense systems in the well-known
"Cuckoo's
Egg"
case. It should not surprise to anyone that foreign intelligence services
increasingly view computer intrusions as a useful tool for acquiring sensitive U.S. government
and private sector information (Freeh, 2000).
Cyber Attacks during GulfWar
TheUnited States vulnerabilty to an attack on its computer systems was demonstrated by attacks
on Department ofDefense computer systems during the GulfWar. The Testimony before a
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Senate committee confirmed that (Mann, 1994), computer hackers from the Netherlands
penetrated thirty-fourDepartment ofDefense computer sites during April andMay of 1991 .
Some of the highlights from the report are as follows:
Many of the sites gave the hackers access to unclassified, sensitive information on topics such as:
(i) military personnelpersonnel performance reports, travel information, and personal reductions
(ii) logistics - descriptions of the type and quantity of equipment being moved; and
(iii) weapons system development data.
Although the information is unclassified, it can be highly sensitive, particularly during times of
international conflict. For example, information from at least one system, which was successfully
penetrated at several sites, directly supported Operation Desert Storm/Shield. In addition,
according to one DOD official, personnel information can be used to target employees whomay
be willing to sell classified information.
U.S. soldiers put their lives on the line to fight a war for a country that cannot even protect the
sensitive information related to their activities, let alone personal data that could be used against
their families. What is most distressing about the report is its conclusion that the hackers
exploited known security holes to gain access to amajority of these systems. The United States
government knew that these security holes were there, yet it did nothing to fix them. The report
also indicates that the hackers "modified and copiedmilitary
information,"
and that many of the
sites were warned of their vulnerability but failed to realize the implications. The report ends with
a warning of things to come: "Without the proper resources and attention, these weaknesses will




Dutch hackers are known to be one of the most respected hacking groups in the world.
Fortunately theDutch exploits were for only educational purposes (U.S.D.O.D, 1991). Their
attacks have been low level, open and recorded by video. Theymade sure that their explorations
were noticed and hence created a user account named 'Vice President Quayle'. If only one of the
Dutch hackers had an alliance with the Iraqi armed force or had amalicious intent the damage
that could have been inflicted on the Allied operations in the Gulf is unimaginable.
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Networked Terrorism
What has been emerging in the business world is now becoming apparent in the organizational
structures of the newer andmore active terrorist groups, which appear to be adopting
decentralized, flexible network structures. The rise ofnetworked arrangements in terrorist
organizations is part ofa widermove away from formally organized, state-sponsored groups to
privately financed, loose networks of individuals and subgroups that may have strategic guidance
but that, nonetheless, enjoy tactical independence (Arquilla & Ronefeldt, 1997).
For example, in the Greater Middle East, terrorist organizations have diverse origins, ideologies,
and organizational structures but can be categorized roughly into traditional and new-generation
groups. Traditional groups date to the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the majority were (and
some still are) formally or informally linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Typically, they are also relatively bureaucratic andmaintain a nationalist orMarxist agenda.
These groups have utilized autonomous cells as part of their organizational structure, but the
operation of such cells is guided by a hierarchy through clear reporting relationships and virtually
little horizontal coordination.
In contrast, the newer and less hierarchical groups (such as Hamas; the Palestinian Islamic Jihad;
Hizbollah; Algeria's Armed Islamic Group; the Egyptian Islamic Group; and Osama bin
Laden'
s
terrorist network, al-Qaeda) have become the most active organizations. In these loosely
organized groups with religious or ideological motives, operatives are part of a network that relies
less on bureaucratic fiat and more on shared values and horizontal coordinationmechanisms to
accomplish its goals (Arquilla & Ronefeldt, 1997).
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The new and more active generation ofMiddle Eastern groups has operated both inside and
outside the region. For instance, in Israel and the occupied territories, Hamas and to a lesser
extent the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have demonstrated their strength over the last five years with
a series of suicide bombings that have killedmore than 100 people. In Egypt, the Islamic Group
(also known as al-Gama'a al-Islamiya) carried out a 1997 attack at Luxor, killing 58 tourists and
four Egyptians. Another string of terrorist attacks (and foiled at-tempts) has focused attention on
a loosely organized group of "Arab
Afghans"
radical Islamic fighters from severalNorth
African andMiddle Eastern countries who have forged ties while resisting the Soviet occupation
ofAfghanistan. One of the leaders and founders of the Arab Afghanmovement is Osama bin
Laden, a Saudi entrepreneur based in Afghanistan (Gambill, 2000).
To varying degrees, these groups share the principles of the net-worked organization relative
flatness, decentralization and delegation of decision making authority, and loose lateral ties
among dispersed groups and individuals. Hamas, for example, is loosely structured with some
elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service
institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda.
According Arquilla and Ronfeldt in their RAND report, which was the result of a year long
project sponsored by the air force deputy chief of staff for air and space operations, these
developments indicate the emergence of a new form of terrorism known as "netwar,\ According
to the report, Netwar is quickly changing the way terrorist groups operate and communicate so it
requires government agencies to develop new defensive strategies (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997).
Netwar
This term refers to an emergingmode of conflict and crime at societal levels, involving measures
short of traditional war, inwhich the protagonists use network forms of organization and related
doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to the information age. The ability of terrorist
Terrorism 51
groups to capitalize on modern technology is now a requisite for developing in the underlying
basis for effective and robust activity. In previous decades, terrorist groups were initially
constrained because accumulation of sizable resources was inevitably linked to sufficient
manpower and the ability to keep growth activities clandestine. The recent introduction of
information technology has not lessened the need to accumulate similar resources but has had
major implications for how they are accrued.
Terrorist groups are relying increasingly on the advanced communications and networks
technologies to revolutionalize theway they organize and carryout attacks, according to Arquilla
and
Ronefeldt'
s report. In this sense terrorist groups are simply exploitingmodern tools to
accomplish the same goals they sought in the past. The difference between conventional terrorist




None of these activities are easily detected or readily countered and this enables terrorist groups
that take advantage of the information technology to create viable support structures to further




iv) Intra and inter group communication
v) Information/intelligence gathering
vii) Stealth/anonymity in the routine activity and tactical operations
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According to Ronald L Dick, Director of National Infrastructure Protection center of the FBI
(Dick, 2001), in his congressional statement on issue of intrusions into government computer
Networks in 2001,"Terrorist groups are increasingly using new information technology and use
Internet to formulate plans, raise funds, spread propaganda and to communicate securely.
Director ofCentral Intelligence George Tenet, in his statement on the world wide threat in 2000,
testified that the terrorists groups including Hizbollah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization and
Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization are using computerized files, e-mail ad encryption to support
operations"
Ronal L. Dick, quoted as an example where convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousuf, the
master mind of the World Trade Center bombing, stored detailed plans to destroy United States
airliners on encrypted files on his lap top computers. Ronald. L. Dick stated, "whole we have not
seen these groups employ cyber tools as a weapon to use against critical infrastructure, their
reliance information technology and acquisition of computer expertise are clear warning signs.
More over we have seen other terrorist groups such as Internet Black Tigers (who are affiliated
with Tamil Tigers); engage in attacks on foreign government web site and e-mail servers. During
the riots on the west bank in the fall of 2000, Israeli government sites were subjected to e-mail
flooding and "ping "attacks. The attacks allegedly originated with Islamic elements trying to
inundate the systems with e-mail messages. As one can see from these examples overseas, "cyber
terrorism"
meaning the use of cyber tools to shutdown critical national infrastructure such as
energy, transportation or government operations for the purpose of coercing or intimidating a
government or civilian
population is thus a very real threat".
It has been observed by Arquilla and Ronefeldt that most modern adversaries of nation states in
the spectrum of low-intensity conflicts, such as guerilla insurgents, drug smuggling cartels, as
well as racial and tribal gangs are all well organized networks even though their leadership may
be quite hierarchical. This could be one of the reasons why military and police institutions often
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face difficulty in engaging in low intensity conflict. They are not configured to combat such
groups. This implies that it requires a network is needed to counter another network. (Arquilla
and Ronefeldt, 1997). The future may belongs to whoevermasters the network
Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe how transnational terrorists use flexible network designs that may
have multiple leaders. They suggest that transnational terrorist groups are increasingly building
transnational networks as "force
multipliers"
and using all manners of old and new technologies
to do so. The shift is from absolute hierarchies, to hydra-headed networks, which are less easy to
decapitate than once they have been. Arquilla and Ronfeldt say Netwar has been modeled by
trends that have been reshaping big global institutions for years. One is the growing influence of
'non-state actors"-corporations, activist groups and other non-governmental organizations and
networks. A second trend is the flattening of hierarchies, both racial and managerial and their
replacement with more fluid and horizontal organizational forms. A third factor is the explosive
growth of computer and telecommunications networking. When these trends take on military
mien, the result is
this:"
The world's most virulent aggressors are not armies whose order of
battle is tidy ziggurat of corps, divisions and brigades but amorphous networks of terror and
crime groups like Osama bin
Laden'
s Al-Qaeda and it affiliates, the Irish Republican Army, and
Columbian narco-trafficking
cartels."
Richard. E. Hayes, president of Evidence based research a company that advises the military on
issue like command and control and information warfare, says, "Al Qaeda and its cousins are
designed to exploit all the advantages of networking robustness, speed, flexibility that business
has discovered. Communications is multi-directional. Command is shared. People are multi-
skilled. Trust is high".
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The FBI investigation into Hamas activity in the US indicates part of
Hamas'
command and
control was located in Tampa, Florida. This is now believed to have moved to London.In London
it publishes Filistine Al Muslima and also has some of its fund raising infrastructure. Another
good example of network form of organizations among terrorist groups is the Algerian Armed
Islamist Group (GIA). The GIA appears to have had a command and control center in Britain for
a few years untouched byBritish authorities (Whine, 1998).
To realize its potential an inter-connected network, requires a capacity for constant, dense
information and communication flows, more so than do other forms of organizations (e.g.
Hierarchies). This capacity is afforded by the latest information and communications
technologies-cellular phones, fax machines, electronic mail (email), world wide web (www) sites
and conferencing. Moreover, network agents are poised to benefit from future increases in the
speed of communications, dramatic reduction in the cost of communications increases in
bandwidth, vastly expanded connectivity, and integration of communication with computing
technologies. Such technologies are highly advantageous forNetwar actorwhose constituents are
geographically dispersed (Arquilla & Ronefeldt, 1997).
The means by which information technology is used by terrorist groups to maintain control over
their networks is briefly discussed below:
Communications
Micheale Zinini and Sean J.A.Edwards in their report on "The Networking of Terror in the
Information Age", state that IT can be used to plan, coordinate, and execute operations. Using
the Internet for communication can increase speed of mobilization and allow more dialogue
between members, which enhances the organizations flexibility, since tactics can be adjusted
more frequently, individuals with a common agenda and goals can form, sub-groups, meet at a
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target, locate, conduct terrorist operations and they readily terminate the relationships and
re-
disperse (Zannini & Edwards, 1999).
The Bin Laden network appears to have adopted information technology to support its network
mode of operations. According to reporters who visited Bin Laden's headquarters in a remote
mountainous region of Afghanistan, the terrorist financier has modern computer and
communications equipment. Bin Laden allegedly used satellite phone terminals to coordinate the
activities of the groups dispersed operations and has ever devised counter measures to ensure his
safety while using such communications systems. Satellite phones reportedly travel in separate
convoys from Bin Laden; he also refrains from direct use, often dictating his message to an
assistant who then relays it telephonically from a different location. Bin Laden's operatives have
used CD-ROM disks to store and disseminate information on recruiting, bomb making, heavy
weapons and terrorist operations (Whine, 1998).US intelligence agencies recently obtained
computer-disk copies of six volume-training manuals used by Bin Laden to train his recruits.
Egyptian computer experts who fought alongside Bin Laden in the Afghan conflict are said to
have helped him devise a communications network that relies on the web, email and electronic
bulletin board so that members can exchange information.
Counter terrorist operations targeting AlgerianArmed Islamic Group (GIA) bases in 1990s
uncovered computers and diskettes with instructions for the instructions for the construction of
bombs. In fact, it has been reported that the GIAmakes heavy use of floppy disks and computers
to store and process orders and other information for its members, who are dispersed in Algeria
and Europe (Whine, 1998). Among terrorist organizations, postingmaterial to inform its
members of its activities are the previously noted Hizb ut-Tahirwhose posting provides details,
including time and date of its regularmeetings around the UK. Themilitant Islamic group
Hamas also uses the Internet to share and communicate operational information. Hamas activists
in theUnited States use chat rooms plan operations and activities.
Hamas'
use ofpass worded and
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codedmessages, clearly presents problems for security agencies. A recent article in Jane's
foreign report suggested that the Islamic security services have been unable to crack the code
used by Hamas. Operatives use e-mail to coordinate actions across Gaza, West Bank and
Lebanon. Hamas has profited to a great extent on secure information exchange on the Internet
because counter terrorism intelligence cannot accuratelymonitor the flow and content of all
Internet traffic.
"According to Israelis, the unidentified terrorists are using the Internet. Without offering
evidence, investigators in the security service, Shin Beth, assert that a full range of
instructions for terrorist attacks, including maps, photographs, directions, codes and even
technical details of how to use the bombs, are being transferred through the Internet.
They suspect that many of the instructions are sent from Britain, where they say that the
Islamic/Palestine organization, Hamas has its main "European base"(Whine, 1998).
Connectivity
Terrorist recruitment and financing have been enhanced by computer networks. There have been
reports of various supremacists groups in the United States using the Internet for financial gain.
It has also been found that terrorist groups such as Peru's Shining Path have websites where
supporters seek to export the revolutionary products like t-shirts, posters and videos.
IT has given the opportunity for individuals and groups to reach and influence a larger audience
that was previously only reserved forwell organized, state funded terrorist organizations. It
represents, inmany respects, the "death ofdistance". The physical distance and national
boundaries which used to distant terrorist from their conspirators, their audience and their targets
seem to have faded away in the world ofmodern telecommunications and the Internet.
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One of the spokesman is reported to have said, "The service is very important for the morale of
the resistance fights. They are always very happy to know that people around the world are
backing them".
Other groups include "news
agencies"
which take in postings from other Islamic sites and
reproduce them. Foremost among them is MSA News, originating in the state ofOhio. On
then-
site one can see messages from the HS, GIA andYakub Zaler, among others.
A posting on June 25 1996, advertised a FIS rally to take place in London Trafalgar Square on
July 7, on behalf of "FIS leaders unjustly detained in Algeria and all prisoners of faith". The
contact address was given as the Algerian community in Britain, operating from a west London
post office box. The speakers were advertised as Tahir De LaNive of the Islamic council for the
defense of Europe, Dr. Amaniar, spokesman for the Afghan Mujahedeen, Dr. Abdul bari of the
Islamic forum in Europe, Dr. Fuzal Khan, leader of Al-Mujahajiroun in Mauritius, Prof.
Francious Burgat, Institute of Research and studies of the Arab world and Muslims (Whine,
1998). Another news agency is Quds Press, which advertises itself as the first Arabic online news
agency reproducing communiques in English and Arabic, and it appears to have offices in
London and Amman.
The site of the campaign for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) contains also postings
from groups not connected with it, as does Global Media Monitoring, the site of the London
based journalist, Parvez Sayed. One of the terrorist sites that particularly aims its message to the
outside worlds is that connected linked to Hizb-ut-Tahir, the Islamic Liberation Party. This first
UK based site was hosted by Imperial College London. But soon after following complaints to
the college authorities, the site was pulled down temporarily, until a new host could be found.
They now post in their names Hizb-ut-Tahir and as Khalifa, providing Internet based access to
their hard-copy material, their literature and their regional activities. Omar Bakri Mohamed the
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leader ofAl-Mujahiroun, (The emigrants) was the founder of Hizb-ut-Tahir in Britain. He later
split from it, claiming differences with middle based leadership.lt has been reported that he also
provides details of its activities as well as lists of its hard-copy publications and contacts on his
website (Whine, 1998).
Another evangelical Islamist organization, Al Muhrabitun, also posts regularly providing details
of its activities and its historical development.
The fact that many terrorists now have direct control over the content of their message offers
father opporttinities for perception management, as well as for image manipulation, special
effects and deception.
An Internet presence can prove advantageous for mobilizing "part time cyber
terrorists"-
individuals not directly affiliated with a given terrorist group who nonetheless support its agenda
and whom malicious software tools and instructions available at a terrorist web site. This
scenario would closely resemble the initiative taken by both the Israeli and Palestinian
governments which have encouraged private citizens to download computer attack tools and
become involved in the conflict surrounding that the al-Aqsa intifadah (Arquilla and Ronefeldt,
1997).
Nearly all the terrorists groups have a web presence. Hizbollah manages multiple web sites.
Web sites can also be used to refine or customize recruiting techniques. Recording which types
of propaganda receive the most browser hits could help tailor a message for a particular audience
using some the same marketing
techniques employed by commercial enterprises, terrorism
servers could capture information about the users who browse their websites and then later
contact those who seem most interested. Recruiters may also use more interactive Internet
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technology to roam online chat room and cyber cafes looking for respective members of the
public, particularly young people. Electronic bulletin board and user nets can also serve as
vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits. Interested computer users around the world can be
engaged in long-term cyber relationship that could lead to friendship and eventual membership
(news.com).
Sample of the websites belonging to the terrorist groups:




ahAl Islamiyyah Egypt www.webstorage.com/~azzam/
Hizb Al-Ikhnan Lebanon www.hizbollah.org
Al-Muslimoon www.almanar.com.lb
Two London based opponents of Al-Saud, dr. Muhammad Al Masari of the committee for the
Defense ofLegitimate Rights(CDLR) and his erstwhile colleague Dr.Saad al Faqqih, now leader
of the movement for Islamic reform, have embraced the Internet as a tool. Another Saudi
opposition group in the USA has set up its own worldwide web homepage while a number of the
Internet discussion groups based in USA provide a means for dissidents to air their views and
contact one another. The London based Bahrain opposition movement, The Bahrain Freedom
Movement (BFM), also uses the net to spread their message, just as they used newsletters or
posters in the past. Due to the limited Internet access in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain,
then-
propaganda campaigns have been targeted mainly at western audience and their compatriots
living in the west. They have, therefore only begun to exploit the potentialities of their new
medium. Once networks spread within the Gulf countries then the net will enable dissidents to
exchange information about events much more easily than at present. Once opposition groups
gain more sophistication they will be able to deploy a full range of offensive information warfare
techniques, not restricted to psychological warfare
propaganda (Arquilla & Ronefeldt, 1997)
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Information Technology Tools used by Terrorists
Encryption
One tool that has become important to terrorist is encryption, as it allows activists to protect
communications and stored information from government interception.
Encryption is a software tool that uses various scrambling techniques to make data unreadable to
anyone other than the intended recipient. Internet users who make purchases online are
undoubtedly familiarwith one form of encryption, the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) technology
used to safely transmit credit card account numbers to e-commerce web sites (Denning, 1999). By
encrypting a message original text is manipulated so that it can be read only by using a key that
unlocks the encryption andmakes the text readable. The encryption technology that has been
rated highly reliable is the public key encryption system. It has two keys
-
private and public. The
user of the system distributes the public key to his/her clients. Themessage intended for the user
can be encrypted using the public key. The encrypted message can only be decrypted using the
corresponding private key. As the user is the only owner of the private key, nobody else can read
the encryptedmessage.
As this technology provides a highly reliable encryptionmechanism that is quite difficult to
crack, it should be positive news for persons who value privacy. Apart from its obvious role in
upholding and furthering the human rights initiatives, the strong encryption technology that helps
conduct secured transactions will naturally augment the commercial transactions over the
Internet.
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One major argument against the free wide circulation of this technology is that it can be used by
antisocial elements and political terrorists to safely correspond and co-ordinate their nefarious
activities against the legally established systems. Terrorist networks can protect their vital
communication flows through readily available commercial technology, such as encryption
programs.
Michelle Zanini and Sean Edwards in their RAND report state that Animal Liberation Front cells
inNorth America and Europe use encryption program (PGP) to send coded email and share
mteUigence(Zannini & Edwards, 1999).New encryption programs emerging in themarket are
becoming so sophisticated that coded emails may soon be extremely difficult to break. Rumors
persist that the French police have been unable to decrypt the hard disk on a portable computer
belonging to a captured member of the Spanish/Basque organization ETA. FBI Director Louis
Freeh said lastMarch during closed-door testimony on terrorism before a Senate panel
said(Freeh, 2000),"Uncrackable encryption is allowing
terrorists- Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda
and others - to communicate about their criminal intentions without fear ofoutside intrusion.
They're thwarting the efforts of law enforcement to detect, prevent and investigate illegal
activities."
PGP
PGP is one of the best examples of encryption software. Human rights activists in Guatemala,
credited their use ofPretty Good Privacy (PGP) with saving the lives ofwitnesses to military
abuses(Denning, 1999).
PGP was originally developed by a Colorado engineer and activist, Phil Zimmermann, who
wanted to make strong encryption available to the public for privacy protection against
government eavesdroppers. The software can be downloaded from the site at: pgpi.org(Denning,
1997). During the installation of the program it automatically installs plug-ins into mail clients
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installed in the system. The plug-ins help to use the PGP features such as sending encrypted
messages directly from the mail client's interface. The plug-ins is available for popular mail
clients such as Eudora and Outlook.
The software was export-controlled, but howeverwithout the knowledge ofZimmermann
someone quickly posted it on a foreign Internet site from where it could be downloaded by
anyone, anywhere, despite export regulations. After this incident there have been several other
encryption tools that have been posted on Internet sites. Ever since, this has become a major topic
ofdebate that the availability of such tools demonstrates the weakness ofexport controls.
Denning states that this is one factor driving export policy towards increased liberalization. But
other factors have also contributed, including the role of encryption in electronic commerce and a
concern that export controls harm the competitiveness of industry. However, that drive is
countered, by a concern that the widespread availability ofencryption tools over the Internet will
make it tougher for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to gather intelligence from
communication interceptions.
U.S. officials say Bin Laden's organizationAl-Qaeda. It is believed that he uses money from
Muslim sympathizers to purchase computers from stores or bymail. Officials say that Bin
Laden's followers download easy-to-use encryption programs from theWeb and have used the
programs to help plan carry out the following three of theirmost recent plots (Arquilla &
Ronefeldt, 1997):
(i)Wadih El Hage, one of the suspects in the 1998 bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa,
sent encrypted e-mails under various names, including
"Norman"
and "Abdus Sabbur", to
"associates in Al
Qaeda,"
according to the Oct. 25, 1998, U.S. indictment against him. Hage went
on trial in federal court inNew York.
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(ii) Khalil Deek, an alleged terrorist arrested in Pakistan in 1999, used encrypted computer files
to plot bombings in Jordan at the turn ofmillennium, U.S. officials say. Authorities foundDeek's
computer at his Peshawar, Pakistan, home and flew it to the National Security Agency in Fort
Meade, Md.Mathematicians, using supercomputers, decoded the files, enabling the FBI to foil
the plot.
(iii)Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind of theWorld Trade Center bombing in 1993, used
encrypted files to hide details ofa plot to destroy 1 1 U.S. airliners. Philippines officials found the
computer in YousefsManila apartment in 1995. U.S. officials broke the encryption and foiled
the plot. Two of the files, FBI officials say, tookmore than a year to decrypt.
Attorney General Janet Reno told a presidential panel on terrorism headed by former CIA John
Deutsch states that extremist groups not only use encryption to disguise their e-mails but their
voices, too (usatoday.com). Encryption programs are capable of scrambling telephone
conversations when the phones are plugged into a computer.
E-Mail Bombs
Intentional bombardment of servers with thousands ofmessages at once, distributedwith the aid
of automated tools, can be termed as 'E-Mail Bombing'. It effects in completely jaming a
recipient's incoming e-mail box, making it impossible for legitimate e-mail to get through. An
e-
mail bomb hence can also be viewed as a form ofvirtual blockade. Although e-mail bombs are
often used as ameans of revenge or harassment, they have also been used to protest government
policies.
U.S. intelligence authorities characterized the Tamil
Guerillas'
attack as the first known attack by
terrorists against a country's computer systems. The ethnic Tamil guerrillas were said to have
swamped Sri Lankan embassies with thousands ofelectronic mail messages (Radu, 2001). The
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messages read "We are the Internet Black Tigers and we are doing this to disrupt your
communications."
The Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam, which had been fighting for an
independent homeland forminority Tamils, claimed responsibility for the 1998 incident.
The e-mail bombing consisted of about 800 e-mails a day for about two weeks. As cited by
Denning, William Church, editor for the Centre for Infrastructural Warfare Studies (CIWARS),
observed that "the Liberation Tigers ofTamil are desperate for publicity and they got exactly
what they wanted ... considering the routinely deadly attacks committed by the Tigers, if this type
of activity distracts them from bombing and killing then CIWARS would like to encourage them,
in the name ofpeace, to domore of this type of "terrorist activity". The attack was successful in
causing fear in the embassies.
The Kosovo conflict also witnessed one of the few e-mail bombing incidents in history. The
protestors on both sides e-mail bombed government sites (cnn.com). According to a report,
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea reported that their server had been saturated at the end ofMarch
by one individual who was sending them 2,000 messages a day. FoxNews reported that when
California resident Richard Clark heard of attacks againstNATO's Web site by Belgrade hackers,
he retaliated by sending an e-mail bomb to the Yugoslav government's site. After a few days,
500,000 e-mails brought the site down. Though he did not claim full responsibility, he claimed to
have played a part. His Internet service provider, Pacific Bell, cut offhis service, as his actions
violated their spamming policy.
The San Francisco-based Institute for Global Communications (IGC) was forced to terminate its
linkwith the Basque People's Journal after outraged Spaniards sabotaged the company's
computer system by overloading itwith a barrage ofjunk e-mail in 1997 (Denning, 1999). The
protestor's wanted the site pulled, their objective was censorship. They bombarded IGC with
thousands ofbogus messages routed through hundreds of differentmail relays. As a result, mail
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was tied up and undeliverable to IGC's e-mail users, and support lines were tied up with people
who couldn't get theirmail. The attackers also spammed IGC staff and member accounts, clogged
theirWeb page with bogus credit card orders, and threatened to employ the same tactics against
organizations using IGC services. The only way IGC could stop the attack was by blocking
access from all of the relay servers.
IGC pulled the site on July 1 8, but not before archiving a copy so that others could put up
mirrors.Within days of the shutdown, mirror sites appeared on halfa dozen servers on three
continents. Chris Ellison, a spokesman for the Internet Freedom Campaign, an English group that
was hosting one of the mirrors, said they believe "the Net should prove an opportunity to read
about and discuss controversial
ideas."
The New York-based journal maintained their objective
was to publish "Information often ignored by the international media, and to build
communication bridges for a better understanding of the
conflict."
An article by Yves Eudes in
the French newspaper Le Monde said the e-mail bomb attack against the IGC site represented an




About a month after IGC removed the controversial Basque journal Euskal Herria Journal from
its servers, Scotland Yards Anti-Terrorist Squad shut down Internet Freedom's U.K. Web site for
hosting the journal. According to a press release from Internet Freedom, the squad claimed to be
acting against terrorism. Internet Freedom said it wouldmove its news operations to its U.S. site.
Euskal Herria Journal case illustrates the power ofprotestors on the Internet. Though IGC chose
to ignore the e-mail demands ofprotestors and continued to host the controversial site, they could
not survive the e-mail bomb attack. The case also illustrates the power of the Internet as a tool for
freedom of speech. Denning states that because Internet venues for publication are rich and
dispersed throughout the world, it is extremely difficult for governments and hacktivists alike to
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keep content completely off the Internet. It would require extensive international cooperation and,
even then, a site could operate out of a safe haven that did not sign on to international agreements.
Flight Simulator
It has been reported that the raids that took place in Florida, where the September 1 1th attackers
lived, officials seized desktop and laptop computers.When they examined the contents of the
computer's hard drive, they found information on piloting and crop dusting downloaded from the
Internet, as well as a flight simulator program, Microsoft's Flight Simulator software. This has
identifiedMicrosoft's Flight Simulator in the media as a possible source of information and
inspiration for the terrorists (usatoday.com ).
After reports of the September 1
1th
attackers using flight simulators there has been a debate over
how much flying can really be learned in computer-based trainers.
Major airlines own and operate sophisticated flight simulators, which cost millions ofdollars. It
has been reported that at least two of the hijackers were trained on a Boeing 727 simulator
facility, in South Florida, in one of the professional schools which is equipped with the flight
simulator (usatoday.com).
Experts believe that with the advanced PC-based simulators that are available today, that it would
not be unreasonable to expect that someone could learn how to operate the instrumentation ofa
large jet by using off-the-shelf technology, such asMicrosoft Flight
Simulator (Gladstone, 2001).
Embry-Riddle, the world's largest university specializing in aviation,
shares a flight simulator on
its campus with the Flight Safety Academy inVero Beach. University officials confirmed that
suspectWaleedAl Sheri, aWTC attacker, graduated in 1997 with a bachelor's degree in
aeronautical science and experienced flight and simulator training.
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History of Flight Simulator
In 1979, Bruce Artwick, an electrical engineering graduate student from the University of Illinois
along with StuMoment both the owners ofa software company named SubLogic, decided to take
the model from
Artwick'
s graduate thesis (amodel of the flight ofan aircraft, displayed on a
computer screen) one step further and developed the first Flight Simulator program for the
Apple-
U (bleep.demon.co.uk). It was followed shortly by a version for the Radio Shack TRS-80. Both
versions completely coded in their respective machine-code. In January 1980 Sub LOGIC FS1 hit
the consumer market . By 198 1 Flight Simulatorwas reportedly the best selling title for the
Apple.
InNovember 1982 Microsoft Flight Simulator 1.01 hit the stores as one of the first PC
entertainment titles, shortly after followed by version 2. MS-FS featured a new and sophisticated
co-ordinate system for the FS-world, developed by Bruce Artwick. And as with all subsequent
releases this first version already demanded so much from computer resources that people had to
run to the computer stores to buy bigger and fastermachines, primarily for the sake of running
Flight Simulator.
Hundreds ofutilities are available onMicrosoft's Flight Simulator, which are used to customize
the simulator so it replicates the instrumentation ofwhatever type of airplane one wants to fly
from a Cessna 1 72S single-engine trainer to the Boeing 747-400 jumbo jet.
TheMicrosoft Flight Simulator provides the "background
material,"
saidDavid Silbergeld, who
frequentlywrites reviews of computer-based simulations. "Whatever utility you add on is used
for the
instrumentation."
For the most part, the largest markets for these products are
in the United Kingdom, Germany and
Japan. Software packages range from about $40 to $100.The flight simulators for the Boeing 767
and 757 happen to be very precise . By the end of 1997 Microsoft claimed to have sold not less
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than 10 million copies ofall versions ofFS, making it the best sold software title in the
entertainment sector. And in 2000Microsoft Flight Simulator was taken up in the Guinness Book
ofRecords with 21 million copies sold per June 1999.
Pilots love can familiarize themselves with the controls ... take a look and play around. The
simulator is very accurate.
In the simulator, a pilot can practice taking off fromNew York's JFK Airport, turn left until
heading due west, and see the skyline ofManhattan. "What you see in the box would be what
you'd see in a night scene TheWorld Trade Centerwas, in fact,
simulated,"
said Sam
Woolsey, a retiredUnited and PanAm captain living in California (nationaldefensemagazine).
JerryWeltsch, a senior aerospace analyst at Frost & Sullivan Aerospace andDefense Research
Group assessed that theMicrosoft program is only for desktop use. He concluded that doesn't
give the feel of the aircraft. It is like a familiarization tool. He stated that as it relies on a mouse or
joystick to fly the airplane; one does not gain hands-on experience with the controls (Ballengar,
2001).
However,Weltsch asserted that a familiarity with behavioral responses to certain controls in the
cockpit and a familiaritywith how the instruments on the cockpit panel look are acquired for
sure. This helps gain a thorough understanding of altitude, air speed, ground speed, direction
relative to switches on the panel and how the airplane responds to certain inputs.
Flight Simulator 2002 comes with a new artificial intelligence system that generates air traffic
around and between airports. It also has enhanced virtual cockpits withworking instruments.
Maps and graphs show the operators how well theymaintain course and altitude. A "graphical
flight
planner,"
is used to plot the route from departure to destination on an interactive map.
According toWeltsch, the hijackers, trained in flight simulators under the supervision ofwell
trained flight instructors. They gained experience of flying in the simulator. Theymay have used
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Microsoft Flight Simulator 2000 just to see what it would look likefrom the cockpit of the type
of airplane theywere going to use, with the panel in front ofthemto fly into theWorld Trade
Center.
According to the FBI press reports, the 19 suspected terrorists received flight training from at
least 10 U.S. flight schools.
Steganopgraphy
Another technology the terrorists may have used is steganography. According toMarkus Kuhn
(about.com),"Steganography is the art and science of communicating in away which hides
the existence of the communication. In contrast to cryptography, where the enemy is
allowed to detect, intercept and modifymessages without being able to violate certain
security premises guaranteed by a cryptosystem, the goal of steganography is to hide
messages inside other harmless messages in a way that does not allow any enemy to even
detect that there is a second secretmessage
present"
Although not widely used, digital steganography involves the hiding ofdata inside a sound or
image file. Steganalysis is the process ofdetecting steganography by looking at variances
between bit patterns and unusually large file sizes.
A personwho views the picture file with a secret message will only see the normal picture
without any distortion; where as the intended recipient can view the data using a steganographic
tool. The effect is that the sender can transmit amessage without ever communicating directly
with the receiver. There is no e-mail between them, no remote logins, and no instant messages.
All that exists is a picture posted to a public forum, and then downloaded by anyone sufficiently
enticed by the subject line (both third parties and the intended receiver of the secret message)
(about.com).
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POSSIBLE USES OF STEGANOGRAPHY DRAWBACKS
Used to combine explanatory informationwith an
image (like doctor's notes accompanying an X-ray)
Could accidentally degrade or render an
image misleading
Embedding corrective audio or image data in case
corrosion occurs from a poor connection or
transmission
Could counteract and be counterproductive
with the original image
Peer-to-peer private communications Doesn't hide the fact that an e-mail was
sent negating the purpose of secret
communications
Posting secret communications on theWeb to
avoid transmission
Someone else with a steganography
detection and cracking tool could expose
the message
Copyright protection A form of this already exists, called digital
watermarking, but requires use of separate
hardware tools because steganographic
software can't use separate hardware tools.
Steganographic software also can't protect
the watermark.
There have been reports about possible use of Steganopgraphy technology by terrorists, however
there are no concrete evidence to prove this.
The first allegation of terrorist groups using steganography technology was made USA Today in
February this year. The report said that "hidden in the X-rated pictures on several pornographic
Web sites and the posted comments on sports chat rooms may lie the encrypted blueprints of the
next terrorist attack against the United States or its allies".
The Pentagon's daily newsletter EarlyBird carried an article on October 18th, warning that Al
Qaeda was planning a "major biological attack".
"
Thewarning was believed to have been based
on an analysis made by formerNational SecurityAgency instructor and experimental nuclear
physicist, DrRobertKoontz. The article said that Dr Koontz had "discovered evidence on the
Internet that Osama bin Ladenwas planning amajor biological warfare campaign, usingmore
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than one form of germ agent. According to Koontz, the Al Qaeda leader was using
"coded"




However, there has been no substantial evidence given by the FBI proving the use of
steganography by terrorists.
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Information Technology to Counter Terrorism
President Clinton's administration saw the biggest economic growth in historywith the
innovation of the new information era. During his eight-year presidency, President Clinton used
information technology to help create a record period ofeconomic prosperity for the United
States
.During President Clinton's administration, policies were introduced to advance computing
and communications programs and funding was increased into key areas of IT through a number
of initiatives.
Even after his presidency, the former president has been a devoted lobbyist of Information
Technology.
President Clinton spoke to BBC World Click Online presenter, Stephen Cole, from the 2002
World Congress on Information Technology (WCIT) in Adelaide after addressing delegates on
the information divide between rich and poor countries. He explained how he believes the
availability ofjust one Internet-connected computer in a remote or poor area would make an
enormous difference. President Clinton said, "I believe that technology gives us a chance to skip a
whole generation in time in the development of educational, economic, health and environmental
advances in the poorest countries in the
world"
.
President Clinton also discussed the implications ofbeing in an interdependent 'global
village'
in
terms of global warming and terrorism and suggested how IT can help to combat terrorism by
using itmore efficiently to track
patterns ofbehavior via informationmanagement systems.
President Clinton said, "You can look for patterns, then if someone with anAmerican visa has ten
addresses they are either really rich or up to no good. . .You
can also use Information Technology
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to build better protections for yourwater systems, your transportation networks and certainly to
build walls against cyber terrorism. . .so a big part of dealing with this terrorist threat will be
maximizing the use of technology for defensive purposes
Experts agree that technology has a role to play in protecting the US from terror attacks. But they
warn thatmuch depends how that technology is used in practice. In the aftermath ofSeptember
1 1th, it emerged that various government agencies had information that might have helped
prevent the attacks. But the problem was that the data were spread over different bodies and
different computer systems (news.bbc.co.uk).
"A piece of data in isolationmaymean absolutely nothing, but put together with other fragments
of data, it may suddenly paint a
picture,"
explained saidDr Ruth David, president ofAnser, an
independent research institution in the US (news.bbc.co.uk).
The FBI is increasingly relying upon technologies to counter terrorism. The FBI has a state of the
art, on-line computer database known as the Terrorist Information System (TIS) containing
information on suspected terrorist groups and individuals. The system has over 200,000
individuals and over 3000 organizations or enterprises. The individuals indexed include not only
subjects of investigations but also known or suspected members of terrorist groups, associates,
contacts, victims and witnesses. The organizations or enterprises include not only terrorist groups
but also affiliated organizations or enterprises. ITS allows the FBI to rapidly retrieve information
and to make links between persons, groups or events (Tritak, 2000).
New IT for detection, prevention, remediation, and attribution of attacks
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Promising to play a central role in the future prevention, detection, and remediation of terrorist
acts, "information
fusion"
is defined as the use ofcomputer technology to acquire data from
many sources, integrate these data into usable and accessible forms, and interpret them. Such
processed data can be particularly valuable for decisionmakers in law enforcement, the
intelligence community, emergency-response units, and other organizations combating terrorism.
Not surprisingly, an inherent problem of information fusion is data interoperabilitythe
difficulty ofmerging data from multiple databases, multiple sources, andmultiple media .In the
bookMaking theNation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism ,
the Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism of the National Research
Council has proposedways in which information fusion can be utilized for security (NATIONAL
ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
Prevention: Security checkpoints have become more important and more tedious than ever at
airports, public buildings, sporting venues, and national borders. But the efficiency and
effectiveness ofcheckpoints could be significantly improved by creating information fusion tools
to support the checkpoint operator in real time. For example, future airport-security stations could
integrate data received from multiple airports to provide amore global view ofeach passenger's
luggage and activities on connecting flights. The stations could use data-miningmethods to learn
which luggage items most warrant hand-inspection, and they could capture data from a variety of
biometric sensors to verify the identities of individuals and search for known suspects
(NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
Detection: Intelligence agencies are routinely involved in information fusion as they attempt to
track suspected terrorists and their activities, but one of their primary problems is managing the
flood of data. There are well-known examples in which planned terrorist activitywent undetected
despite the fact that relevant evidence was available to spot it. The evidence was just one needle
in a huge haystack. Future intelligence and law-enforcement activities could therefore benefit
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enormously from advances in automatic interpretation of text, image, video, sensor, and other
kinds ofunstructured data. This would enable the computer to sort efficiently through the massive
quantities ofdata to bring the relevant evidence (likely combined from various sources) to the
attention of the analyst (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
Response: Early response to biological attacks could be supported by collecting and analyzing
real-time data, such as admissions to hospital emergency rooms and veterinary offices or
purchases of drugs in grocery stores, and integrating it with background information about the
affected patient's residence and job address. Prototype systems are already under development,
including one that monitors real-time admissions to 17 emergency departments near Pittsburgh, to
generate profiles ofER visits, and discern patterns of activity. If anomalous patterns emerge that
may signify an outbreak of some new pathogen, system administrators can quickly alert health
officials (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
Many other opportunities exist for such computer-aided "evidence-based decision
making."
For
example, the monitoring ofactivity on computer networks might flag potential attempts to break
through a firewall; or sensor networks attached to public buildings might flag patterns of activity
within the building that suggest suspicious behavior. In these kinds of cases, because the data is
voluminous and derives from a variety of sources, an unaided decisionmakermight have
difficulty detecting subtle patterns.
As a general proposition, the development of tools that provide human analysts with assistance in
doing their jobs has a higher payoff (at least in the short to medium term) than tools that perform
most or the analyst's entire job. This places a greater emphasis on approaches that use technology
to quickly sift large volumes ofdata to flag potentially interesting data items for human attention
(as opposed to approaches that rely on computers to make high-level inferences themselves in the
absence ofhuman involvement and judgment).
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A final dimension of information fusion is non-technical, that is, disparate institutional missions
maywell dictate against a sharing of information at all. Underlying successful information fusion
efforts is a desire to share information . It is impossible to fuse information belonging to two
agencies if those two agencies do not communicate with each other. Establishing the desire to
communicate among all levels at which relevant information could be sharedmay have a larger
impact than the fusion that might occur due to advances in technology.
DataMining
With the proliferation ofdata warehouses, datamining tools are flooding the market. Datamining
methodology extracts hidden predictive information from large databases. Their objective is to
discover hidden gold in your data. Many traditional report and query tools and statistical analysis
systems use the term "data
mining"
in their product descriptions. Exotic Artificial Intelligence-
based systems are also being touted as new datamining tools. The ultimate objective ofdata
mining is knowledge discovery. That's where technology comes in: for true knowledge discovery
a datamining tool should unearth hidden information automatically (Thuraisingham, 2002).
A typical commercial application of datamining is fraud detection for credit cards, telephone
calls, and insurance claims (by learning from historical data on transactions known to be
fraudulent). Other applications are in assessingmortality risk formedical patients (by learning
from historical patient data) and predicting which individuals are most likely to make certain
purchases (by analyzing data on other
individuals'
past purchasing). The majority of these
commercial a^ta-mining applications involve well-structured data. Limitations of the current
commercial technology include the inability to mine data that is a combination of text, image,
video, and sensor information (that is, data in
"non-structured"
formats) as well as the inability to
incorporate the knowledge ofhuman experts into the clata-mining process. Despite the significant
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value ofcurrent maclnne-learning algorithms, there is also a need to develop more accurate
learning algorithms formany classes ofproblems (Thuraisingham, 2002).
This technologymay prove to be a powerful tool to search for information about suspected
people .
Language Technologies
The area of language technologies has developed a wide variety of tools to deal with very large
volumes of text and speech. Themost obvious commercial examples are theWeb search engines
and speech-recognition systems that incorporate technology developed withDefence Adavanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) andNational Science Foundation (NSF) funding. Other
important technologies include information extraction (e.g., extraction of the names ofpeople,
places, or organizations mentioned within a document), cross-lingual retrieval (e.g., does an
Arabic e-mail message involve discussion ofa chemical weapon?), machine translation,
summarization, categorization, filtering (monitoring streams of data), and link detection (finding
connections). Most of these approaches are based on statistical models of language andmachine-
learning algorithms ( American Institute ofPhysics, 2000).
A great deal ofonline information, in the form of text such as e-mail, news articles, memos, and
pages onWeb sites, is ofpotential importance for intelligence applications. Research is needed on
methods for accurately extracting from text certain structured information such as descriptions of
events, that is, the date, type of event, actors, and roles. Research is needed to handle multiple
languages, including automatic translation, cross-lingual information retrieval, and rapid
acquisition ofnew languages. Other important areas of future research are link detection (related
to the normalization problemmentioned above) and advanced question answering.
Evidence Combination
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Many of the techniques used to combine information from multiple sources, as in video indexing
or meta search engines, are ad hoc. Current research on principle-basedmethods for reasoning
under uncertainty needs to be extended and tested extensively inmore demanding applications.
This is a key technical problem, withwidespread implications formany of the applications
mentioned above e.g., how to combine evidence from hospital admissions and from
nonprescription drug purchases to detect a probable bioterrorist attack; how to combine evidence
from face recognition and voice print to estimate the likely identity ofa person; or how to
combine evidence frommultiple sensors in a building to detect anomalous activity (NATIONAL
ACADEMIES PRESS, 2001)
Technologies to Address Future Passenger Screening Requirements
There has always been a trade-offbetween technology performance and public acceptance when
it comes to technological improvements in airport security screening. Major concerns over health
effects rises everytime a change is done to the metal-detection portals.
Imaging Technologies
Imaging technologies can produce an image of the human body underneath the clothes. The
amount of detail presented by the images depends upon the technology used. However, none of
the technologies gives images with photographic quality. Operators view and interpret these
images. (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1996).
Imaging technologies are classified as either passive or active.
Passive screening-Here the natural radiation emitted by the human body is detected and
analyzed. There is minimal concern about radiation.
Active imaging
- This involves irradiating the body with x-rays or millimeter waves and
analyzing the radiation
scattered from the body.
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In both these imaging procedures any object (e.g., metallic weapons or explosivematerials) that
emits or scatters radiation differently from the human bodywill appear different from the
background on the image. Currently, images are viewed and interpreted by an operator. Research
is required in developing effective, automated image-interpretation capabilities that would
eliminate the operator from the routine screening process as such routines are always prone to
human error.
Images that are produced by these technologies are of sufficiently high quality to make them
effective for screening passengers (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1996). However, when
the perceived level of threat is low, passengers, crews, and others passing through screening
checkpoints are likely to object to having images of their bodies displayed. There aremany
concerns about the use and storage of the data used to generate images. Researchers believe that
procedures, such as having operators of the same sex view the images ormoving operators away
from the screening checkpoints, could allay concerns. Financial and logistical deterrents of these
procedures make imaging technologies extremely unattractive for use as primary screening
systems at all checkpoints. It is difficult to quantify the level of threat at which the public would
start accepting such invasion ofprivacy however it is highly important to do it before putting any
such imaging technologies to use.
There have been a lot of concerns about health effects when talking about implicating such
imaging technologies. However, the levels of radiation exposure required for image production
are insignificant compared to the levels experienced during many other common activities,
including airplane flights. It can be seen that most of the concerns have more to do with only
perception. Hence it is necessary to address these perception and bring to the knowledge of the
people that these radiations are not harmful. (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1996).
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Trace-Detection Technologies
Trace-detection technologies work by physically collecting samples ofair or material from
clothing or bodies of individuals and use the samples to infer the presence ofdangerous materials.
Sampling the air around individuals or touching them to remove particles of explosive materials
from them or their belongings (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1996). There aremany
techniques that can be used to identify chemical compounds of interest. The specifications of the
chemical-identification technologies are less likely to cause passenger concern than the sample
collection techniques.
Trace-detection technologies are still in the development phase, especiallywith regard to methods
of sample collection andmatching appropriate sampling techniques with chemical-identification
technologies. Therefore, it is more difficult to comment on specific passenger screening scenarios
involving trace-detection technologies.
Sample collection for trace-detection technologies entails the physical transfer ofmaterial from
the person being screened to the screening equipment. Although sampling the air around a person
is less intrusive, however it is likely to be less effective, than touching the person to collect a
sample. When considering technologies that require touching, one of the major concerns is
people's aversion to being touched either by inanimate objects, such as bars or fronds, or by
operators wielding hand-wand devices. It is extremely difficult to address this issue as the desire
to preserve distance from strangers is deeply ingrained and is often influenced by basic cultural
and religious beliefs. It is not likely to change the optimum distance people maintain between
themselves and others through public information campaigns as this varies greatly from person to
person and from culture to culture (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1996). Concerns about
privacy, about initiating physical contact, and the transmission ofdiseasemay prove to be
significant hurdles to implementing new technologies.
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Trace-detection technologies are also being considered for use in screening hand-carried baggage
and personal electronic devices. There are likely to be less intense objections to touching these
items than objections to touching people themselves. One effective way of transportingmaterial
from a person to screening equipmentmay be by collecting samples from areas that a person is
likely to have touched. Samples collected from hoarding cards may be a practical and less
intrusive way of implementing trace-detection technologies in passenger screening.
The major limitation ofpresent language and image technologies is that their accuracy and
performance, despite significant progress, need to be considerably improved. This is particularly
true for counterterrorist systems where the datamay be very noisy (that is, surrounded by
irrelevant information) and sparse.Work is needed on improved algorithms for image
interpretation and speech recognition. Many of these research issues are specific to problems
arising in a particular medium that is, recent progress on face recognition has come primarily
from understanding how to extract relevant image features before applyingmachine learning
methods, though this approachmay not be applicable to machine learning in other contexts.
However, new research is also needed on perception based on mixed media e.g., speech
recognition based on sound combinedwith lip motion (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS,
1996).
Research required for effective deployment of Information Technology
Though the potential of Information Technology is recognized, information systems security,
especially in its operational dimensions, has
received far less attention and focus than the subject
deserves in light ofa growing U.S. military dependence on
information dominance as a pillar of
its war fighting capabilities. A thorough understanding of
how information technology can be
deployed to reduce risks is highly essential.
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Information and Network Security
A broad overview of some of the major issues in information and network security is contained in
the Computer Science and TechnologyBoard (CSTB) report Cyber security Today and
Tomorrow: PayNow or PayLater (NATIONALACADEMIESPRESS, 2002) .
Despite diligent efforts to create an effective perimeter defense for computer and
telecommunications systems, penetration by a determined adversary is highly likely. Software
flaws, lax procedures for creating and guarding passwords, compromised insiders, and non-secure
entry points all lead to the conclusion that watertight perimeters cannot be assumed. Nevertheless,
strengthening defensive perimeters is helpful, and this section deals withmethodologies (those of
today and tomorrow) that can detect or confine an intruder and, ifnecessary, aid in recovery from
attack by taking corrective action.
The need for information systems security and trust can be formulated in terms of severalmajor
requirements:
Data confidentialitycontrolling who gets to read information in order to keep sensitive
information from being disclosed to unauthorized recipients, e.g., by preventing the
disclosure of classified information to an adversary;
Data integrityassuring that information and programs are changed, altered, ormodified
only in a specified and authorizedmanner, e.g., by preventing an adversary from
modifying orders given to combat units so as to shape battlefield events to his advantage;
System availabilityassuring that authorized users have continued and timely access to
information and resources, e.g., by preventing an adversary from flooding a network with
bogus traffic that delays legitimate traffic such as that containing new orders from being
transmitted; and
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System configuration-assuring that the configuration ofa system or a network is
changed only in accordance with established security guidelines and only by authorized
users, e.g., by detecting and reporting to higher authority the improper installation ofa
modem that can be used for remote access (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
The requirement for accountability cuts across these four requirements. Accountability is
knowingwho has had access to information or resources. The listing shows that securitymeans a
lot more than protecting information from disclosure (e.g., classified information). According to
the DOD
, much of the information on whichmilitary operations depend is not classified. Though
the disclosure of this informationmay not cause any harm, the alteration or a delay in
transmitting it certainly could. Access to unclassified information can always present a threat to
some extent (e.g., access to personnel medical records used to enable blackmail attempts).
Satisfying these security requirements requires a range of security services, including:
Authentication
ascertaining that the identity claimed by a party is indeed the identity of
that party. Authentication is generally based on what a party knows (e.g., a password),
what a party has (e.g., a hardware computer-readable token), or what a party is (e.g., a
fingerprint);
Authorization-granting ofpermission to a party to perform a given action (or set of
actions);
Auditing-recording each operation that is invoked alongwith the identity of the subject
performing it and the object acted
upon (as well as later examining these records); and
Non-repudiation~the use of a digital signature procedure affirming both the
integrity of a givenmessage and the identity
of its creator to protect against a
subsequent attempt to deny authenticity (NATIONALACADEMIES PRESS,
2002).
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IT and C4I for Emergency Response
The creation, communication, analysis, and exploitation of information have always played a key
role inmilitary strategy and operations. However, the recent advancement in the development of
information and communications technologies has dramatically influenced themilitary operations
in realizing the strategic role of information. Positioning effective exploitation of these
technology advances as a critical success factor inmilitary affairs. The technological
advancement has become the drivers and enablers for the "nervous
system"
of themilitary.
Military operations are relying upon technology to develop its command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (CAT) systems, to more effectively use the
"muscle"
side of the military, namely the weapons and platforms and troops. The growing importance of
C4I systems reflects an information technology-driven transformation of strategy and operations
similar to what is occurring across almost every segment of society (NATIONAL ACADEMIES
PRESS, 1999).
There are many options for helping to facilitate interoperable crisis communications among
emergency-response agencies. For example, it is likely that some portion of the public networks
will survive any disaster; emergency-response agencies could use it to facilitate interoperability if
there are mechanisms for giving them first priority for such use. A second option is to allocate
dedicated spectral bands for emergency responders and to require by law that they use those
frequencies. A third option is to mandate frequency and waveform standards for emergency
responders so that they are interoperable. A fourth option is to develop technology to facilitate
interoperable communications among emergency responders. Of course, these options are not
mutually exclusive.
In addition, numerous computational and
database facilities must be established to provide
complete and real-time information to diverse constituencies whose information and
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communication requirements, security needs, and authorizations all differ (NATIONAL
ACADEMIES PRESS, 1999). These facilities must be established quickly, as minutes and even
seconds matter in the urgent, early stages ofan incident. Furthermore, tight security is essential,
especially if the incident is the result ofa terrorist attack, because an active adversarymight try to
subvert the communications or destroy data integrity. In addition, an atmosphere ofcrisis and
emergency provides opportunities for hostile elements to overcome securitymeasures that are
normally operative under non-emergency circumstances; thus, another research area is how to
build systems that permit security exceptions to be declaredwithout introducing new
vulnerabilities on a large scale.
Efforts to coordinate communications are complicated by the fact that emergency response to a
large-scale incident has many dimensions, including direct on-the-ground action and response,
management of the incident response team, operations, logistics, planning, and even
administration and finance (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1999). Moreover, response
teams are likely to include personnel from local, county, state, and federal levels.
In the book "Realizing the Potential ofC4I : Fundamental Challenges", the author suggests
research in a number ofareas can advance the state of the art for emergency response C4I
systems, thereby improving their effectiveness for terrorist incidents.
In addition, it is stated, the development ofbetter
C4I systems for emergency responsewill have




In an emergency, extraordinary demands
are placed on communications capacity. A disaster is
likely to destroy some but not the
entire communications infrastructure in a given area, leaving
some residual capability. Meanwhile, the disaster
provokes greater demands for communication
from the general public. The result is often a
denial-of-service condition for all, including
emergency-communications services. The absence ofa telephone dial tone in a disaster area is
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common because of increased demands. Even under high-traffic but non-emergency situations,
cell-phone networks are sometimes unable to handle the volume ofusers in a given cell because
of statistical fluctuations. Nor is the Internet immune to such problems congestion of shared
Internet links, including both last-mile and aggregated feeder links, can cause lockouts to occur
on facilities that are still operational in the disaster area (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS,
1999).
Research is needed on using residual (and likely saturated) capacitymore effectively, deploying
additional (surge) capacity, and performing the tradeoffs among different alternatives. One
problem in this area is themanagement of traffic congestion and the development ofpriority
overrides for emergency usage (and prevention of the abuse of such authority). A second problem
is that optimization algorithms for communications traffic that are appropriate in normal times
may have to be altered during emergencies. For example, the destruction ofphysical facilities
such as repeaters and the massive presence of debris could result in an impaired environment for
radio-frequency transmissions. The rapid deployment ofprocessors optimized to find
weak
signals in a suddenly noisier environment could do much to facilitate emergency communications
(NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1999). DSL systems, for example, can reallocate huge
bandwidth to a single phone line by coordinating it with all the phone lines nearby (one can
sometimes get 10 times the bandwidth if this is done right). Under normal circumstances, the
interests of the other users would defeat such a system (with cross talk), but in an emergency
those interests could be reprioritized.
Research is also needed for self-adaptive networks that can reconfigure themselves in response to
damage and changes in demand and that can degrade gracefully. For example,
in a congested
environment, programmed
fallback to less data-intensive applications (e.g., voice rather than
video, text messaging
rather than voice) may provide minimal communications facility. Even
today, many cellular networks
allow the passing of text messages. Also, public and private
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elements of communications infrastructure could both be tapped to provide connectivity in a
crisis, as happened inNewYork City on September 1 1 .
In addition, theWhite House's National Communications System office has moved to implement
awireless priority service that facilitates emergency recovery operations for the government and
local emergency-service providers. This servicewill be implemented in phases, with an
immediate solution available in early 2002 in selectedmetropolitan areas and a nationwide
solution (yet to be developed) scheduled for late 2003. Furtherwork after 2003 will concentrate
on the development and implementation of third-generation technologies that enable high-speed
wireless data services (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2000).
Security ofRapidlyDeployedAdHocNetworks
Themanagement of communications networks poses unique problems in a crowded, emergency
disaster zone. Securitymust be established rapidly from the outset, as the terrorists might try to
mix among the first responders. It is also necessary to determine a means for temporarily
suspending people's access to facilities, communications, and data without impeding the ability
of those with legitimate need to use them. Yet this suspension process has to be done rapidly,
given thatminutes and seconds matter in severe emergencies.
Research is therefore needed on the special security needs ofwireless networks that are deployed
rapidly and in an ad hoc manner (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002). (For example, ad
hoc networks are not likely to have a single system administrator that can take responsibility for
allocating user IDs.)
Information-Management andDecision-Support Tools
In a chaotic disaster area, a large volume ofvoice and data traffic will be transmitted and received
on handheld radios, phones, digital devices, and portable computers. Nevertheless, useful




tools that assist the crisis manager inmaking the most of this incomplete information
(NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
Communications with the Public during an Emergency
During a crisis, there is high need for channels to provide information to the public. Today, the
radio, television, and often theWeb play a vital role in providing such information, however, this
information is not area specific and is usually generic. The authors of the book Making the
Nation Safer: The Role ofScience and Technology in Countering Terrorism ", believes research
is needed to identify appropriate mechanisms new technologies such as "call by
location"
and
zoned alert broadcasts for tailoring information to specific locations or individuals. To be
effective in interacting with individual users, ubiquitous and low-cost access is required.
In addition, such systems should be highly robust against spoofing (entry by an intruder
masquerading as a trusted host) so that only authorized parties can use them to send out
information. For example, the current cell-phone system does not directly support these functions,
but it might be possible to modify and exploit it to provide "reverse 91
1"
service i.e., a one-way
channel to those affected that provides a continual flow of relevant information and guidance.
Suchmechanisms would probably have to be locally self-sufficient, that is, the disastermight
spare the local cell site. A temporary cell site could be deployed along withwireless alternatives,
but access to central services might not be possible (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
Finally, providing information to those located outside
the immediate emergency area gives
important psychological comfort and helps to mitigate the disaster's
consequences. (For example,
in the immediate aftermath of the September 1 1 attacks,
"I'm
alive"
bulletin boards sprang up
spontaneously.) Research is needed
for establishing more effective means of achieving this
objective especially
in updating the status ofaffected
peoplewhile compromising the local
communications infrastructure to aminimal degree
(NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
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EmergencySensorDeployment
During an emergency, responders need information about physical on-the ground conditions that
is sufficiently fine-grained and accurate to be useful. It is virtually inevitable that no preexisting
sensor networkwill be in place to provide adequate information, so the deployment of sensors in
response to a disaster is likely to be necessary. Depending on the nature of the emergency, sensor
capacitywould be needed to identify and track the spread ofnuclear, chemical, or biological
contaminants, characterize and track vehicular traffic, locate survivors (e.g., through heat
emanations, sounds, or smells), and find pathways through debris and rubble. Developing robust
sensors for these capabilities is one major challenge; developing architectural concepts for how to
deploy them and integrate the resulting information is another.
PreciseLocation Identification
In a severe crisis, determining the location both ofphysical structures and ofpeople is a major
problem because ofdebris, airborne contaminants such as smoke and dust, and perhaps simply a
lack of iUumination. Therefore, technological solutions, such as embedded location sensors, are
probably essential. Distributed sensor networks, either already in place or deployed in response to
an incident, can be valuable information sources. While technologies like the Global Positioning
System could also play amajor role, airborne contaminants and equipment damage might render
them ineffective. The information needs of the responders and those affected will thus require
rapid access to accurate databases ofblueprints and building diagrams, for example. Research is
needed to develop digital floor plans andmaps ofother physical infrastructure. The resulting data
could be stored in geographic information systems (GIS), which would allow responders to focus
on the high-probability locations ofmissing people (such as lunchrooms) and avoid dangerous
searches of low-probability locations (such as storage areas). Research is needed inwearable
computers for search-and-rescue operations so that responders could update the GIS in real time
as they discover victims and encounter
infrastructural damage. Another research area is in "map
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distributed, self-organizing robots deployed in a disaster area to sense movement or body
heat, for instance (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
It may also be possible to develop technology to generate the data for accuratemaps ofa debris-
strewn disaster location. Finally, keeping track of emergency
responders'
positions within a
disaster area is an essential element ofmanaging emergency response. Technology (similar to
E-
91 1 for cell phones) to monitor the progress of these individuals automatically is not yet available
on a broad scale.
Mapping the Physical Infrastructure ofIT
As noted above, the telecommunications infrastructure is for themost part densely connected;
hence physical attack is unlikely to disrupt it extensively for long periods of time. However, the
physical infrastructure of telecommunications (and the Internet) does not appear to be well
understood (that is, immediate knowledge ofwhere various circuits are located is unavailable),
and there maywell exist critical nodes whose destructionwould have a disproportionate impact.
On the other hand, knowing where these critical nodes are is difficult for both network operators
and terrorists. Thus, an important priority is to develop tools to facilitate the physical mapping of
network topology, and to begin that mapping now with the tools that are currently available. This
is particularly important for converged networks over which both voice and data are carried
(NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 2002).
As one example, consider that a firm that installs fiber-optic cables in a city's sewers is capable of
mapping those sewers as well using a sewer-crawling
robot that lays cable and tracks its position.
Characterizing the Functionality ofRegional
NetworksforEmergency Responders
To developmechanisms for coordinating
emergency-response activities, it is necessary to
understandwhat the various communications and computer networks ofemergency responders in
a given region are supposed to do. For example, managers from different agencies often speak
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different "languages" in describing their needs, capabilities, and operational priorities; a common
conceptual framework for these purposes would be enormously helpful for coordination of
planning activities, yet one is not yet available. Sharing of information among the various
providers ofcritical infrastructure and emergency-response agencies, even about common tasks
and processes, has been a rather uncommon activity in the past (NATIONAL ACADEMIES
PRESS, 2002).
The Impact of C4I in the past
The real-world impact ofC4I technology in enhancing the effectiveness and security of the
coalition forces was amply demonstrated during the GulfWar (USDOD, 1991).
The allied forces depended upon highly tenuous C4I capabilities and relied on inadequate
methods for construction and distribution ofoperational plans and execution oforders, collection
and assessment ofbattle damage information, and coordination ofoperations on a global scale
among systems ranging from highly sophisticated to significantly outdated (USDOD, 1991).
A formidable capabilitywas established in a span of sixmonths for command and control of a
multinational force in a region of the worldwhere virtually no infrastructure previously existed to
accommodate such complex operations. After the success of the GulfWar, C4I has been reported
in numerous after-actionmedia as amajor forcemultiplier in the conflict. As stated by the
Department ofDefense these are the followingways in which C4I proved to be effective during
the GulfWar:
* C4I systems supported through simultaneous suppression ofenemy air defensesmade highly
effective, precise, orchestrated
strikes on a variety of targets in Baghdad on the initial night of
war, with extremely low casualties.
* The Global Positioning System allowed orchestrated
movements ofcoalition armored forces to
outflank Iraqi forces and engage them at the maximum effective range of coalition weapons.
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Again in Bosnia, advanced C4I technology has provided forces with enhanced capabilities to
detect, process, decide, and communicate. For example:
* The PredatorUnmanned AerialVehicle has improvedmonitoring ofcompliance with the
Dayton Peace Accord.
* Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe systems have facilitated the sharing of
intelligence among selected coalition partners.
* The Joint Surveillance Target Airborne Radar System supported the insertion ofground forces
into Bosnia (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1999).
Thewar fighter who returned from the GulfWar strongly believed that improvement in C4I
capability and interoperabiUty would addmore value to military operations than additional
improvements in weapons. The continuous improvement in the precision and/or lethality of
weapons has always been a priority; however, experts believe that such enhancements in
capabilities maywell resultmore from application ofC4I improvements than from near-term
advancements in weapons technology. (Zdon, 2001).
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Planning for the Future
Planning for the future is also a critical dimension of any research agenda, though the resources
devoted to it need not be large. New system architectures and technologies, such as switched
optical networks, mobile code, and open source or multinational code development, will have
different vulnerabilities and hence require different defense strategies. Similarly, new device
types such as digital appliances, wireless headphones, and network-capable cell phones pose new
challenges. Even today, it is hard to interconnect systems with different securitymodels or
security semantics; and unless we deal with this problem, it will become increasingly difficult in
the future.
Furthermore, the characteristics ofdeployed technology that protect the nation against
catastrophic IT-only attacks today (e.g., redundancy, system heterogeneity, and a reliance on
networks other than the Internet for critical business functions) may not be efficient enough in the
future. Indeed, some trends, such as deregulation, systemmonocultures, and the dominance ofa
smaller number ofproducts, are pushing the nation's critical infrastructure providers to reduce
excess capacity, even though this is what provides much of the redundancy so important to
reduced vulnerability (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, 1996).
For these reasons, researchers and practitionersmust be vigilant to
changes in network
technology, usage and reliance on IT, and potentially decreasing diversity. In addition, research
focused on the future is likely to have a slant that differs from those of the other research efforts
described in this chapter.While the latter efforts might be characterized as building on existing
bodies ofknowledge (and are in that sense incremental), future-oriented research would have a
more radical orientation: It would try to develop alternative paradigms for secure and reliable
operation that would not necessarily be straightforward evolutions from the Internet and
information technology of today. For example,
one such pursuitmight be the design of
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appropriate network infrastructure for deployment in 2020 that would be much more secure than
the Internet of today. Anothermight be an IT infrastructure whose security relied on engineered
system diversity in which deployed systems were sufficiently similar to be interoperable yet




As pressure mounts for the government to collect and process more information, it becomes
increasingly important to address the question ofhow to minimize the negative impacts on
privacy and data confidentiality. Research is needed to provide policymakers with accurate
information about the impact on confidentiality ofdifferent kinds of data disclosure. Research is
also needed on new data-mining algorithms that discover general trends in data without requiring
full disclosure of the individual data records. One example is data-mining algorithms that work
by posing statistical queries to each of a set of databases, rather than gathering every data record
into a centralized repository (Thuraisingham, 2002).
Another is zero-knowledge data niining, in which general trends in data can be uncovered without
requiring full disclosure of individual data records. (However, note that formany applications
such as badges and access tokens, personal information of the sort mentioned is not necessary; the
only requirements are that the token be recognizable as valid and that it has been issued to the
person presenting it. It doesn't even have to have an individual's name on it.)
A related issue is the fact that a sufficient aggregation ofnon-personally identified information
can often be used to identify a person uniquely. For example, identifying someone as aman of
Chinese extraction with a doctorate in physics who enjoys swing dancing, has an adopted 7-year-
old daughter, and lives in upper-northwestWashington, D.C., is likely sufficient to specify a
unique individual. Thus, the mere fact that information is disconnected from personal identifiers




The thesis concludes that there is no doubt that our transition into the Information era has caused
a major shift in the paradigm of the age old phenomenon of terrorism andmilitary operations.
Terrorism today is greatly influenced by the advance in information technology. The very same
technology that we depend upon on a daily basis is being used by perpetrators to harm the safety
of our existence. Information Age brings with itmany security concerns and uncertainties. The
modern information technology gives the opportunity to terrorists to cause havoc and chaos all
over the world at the comfort of their homes. Information technology will play a major role in
providing a wide range of options for the terrorists. Information technology is being used by
terrorists both as a tool as well as a target.
Information technology has greatly enhanced the shift of terrorist organization from a hierarchical
form to a networked form. Just as the businesses today are adopting network form of
organizations for the relative flatness, flexibility and connectivity, terrorist organizations are also
harnessing upon these advantages. Terrorists are increasingly relying upon information
technology to manage their networked organizations. This is done through propaganda and
communication. The Internet, the greatest innovation of the Information Age, plays a vital role
helping the terrorists achieve this. It can be seen thatWeb sites are being used to great extent for
propagation as well as information gathering. Computers and floppy diskettes were retrieved
from the terrorist caves inAfghanistan which proves that terrorists today are also highlywired.
Terrorists today are reported to be using many advanced information technology tools such as
encryption, e-mail bombing, flight simulators; steganography etc., as most of these technologies
comes with no regulatory policies.
Cyber space brought the world closer. National boundaries disappeared. What we weren't aware
ofus that it also brought us closer to criminals, perpetrators and social enemies such as terrorists.
The distance banished and space we lived together on, the cyber space became a favorable
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platform for their actions. Cyberterrorism in its real sense has yet to occur. However, the
vulnerabilities and susceptibilities of the national infrastructures cannot and should not be treated
lightly. It is very important to consider the destructive effect of such an attackwhile designing
strategic military operations. It can be noted that there are no compelling reasons to believe that
cyber attacks will be anymore deadly than conventional ones. The terrorist desire to escalate
current levels ofviolence are as much dependent on who the groups are andwhat they hope to
achieve, as upon the weapons they have at hand.
It is not enough to simply equate the effect ofcyberterrorismwith conventional terrorist attacks,
but a much wiser approachwill examine how the cyber environment both facilitates and
influences a terrorist to pursue such an attack over a conventional one. It is also necessary to
examine how a cyber attack effect the flow of information and cause the disability to take counter
measures.
Information terrorism poses a great threat to all ThirdWave nations. Increasing security and
gathering accurate intelligence regarding any plans ofattack
that might be in consideration can
ensure that the threat of terrorism is minimal and the effect is less destructive from which the
United States can recover.
We certainly are, as Al Gore once noted
thatmethods ofwarfare will continue to evolve as the
revolution progresses. And hence the conceptions ofnational security will also have to evolve
There is no doubt that information warfare and information securitymust be incorporated into the
national security agenda of any
nation that is making the transition into the Information Age.
Isaac Asimov notes that "Waiting for a crisis to force us to act globally runs the risk ofmaking us
wait too
long"
(Petersen, 1994). This can not be the case where information technologies are
concerned, as they are the very
foundation of today's society. John Petersen points that a
"philosophy comes bundledwith every
new technology; when one is embraced, the other is there
as well "(Petersen, 1994).
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According to Devost ,t he U.S. Military needs to adapt to new technology or it faces the prospect
ofallowing itself to grow flaccid and obsolete. The issues raised in this paper have no direct
solution. There is a strong need for the awareness of the strengths and, more importantly, the
weaknesses that technology brings to an organization (Julie, 1993).
The policy questions that dominate the issue ofcritical infrastructure protection -:
i)What and how limited is the role of the government.
ii)What is the most adequate infrastructure security
iii) How to determine appropriate standards
iv)What data does the government need from the people and why.
A few basic principles are emerging that should guide infrastructure protection efforts as stated
by O'neil and Dempsey. (O'Neil & Dempsey, 2000):
* General or centralized monitoring of communications need not and should not be a chiefor
central component of the government's response to computer security. There are other activities -
notably the identification and closing of existing vulnerabilities
- that should be given higher
priority.
*
Authority for increasedmonitoring of information systems is not required and should be
rejected. Rather, the underlying laws formonitoring communications systems and accessing
stored data should be strengthened.
* The role of the FBI and the (National Security Agency) NSA in computer security should be
carefully limited: it has been demonstrated that their surveillance agendas trump their protective
missions, and their activities are often so cloaked in secrecy as to generate understandable
suspicion.
* Oversight of infrastructure protection should be institutionalizedwithin the Executive Branch
and should be accessible to the public. There should be established within the Executive Branch
appropriate mechanisms for oversight of computer security issues, involving both industry
representatives and privacy advocates.
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*
Congress must follow this issue carefully, and should insist upon periodic reports on the status,
scope, and effectiveness of critical infrastructure activities, with special focus onmonitoring and
intrusion detection initiatives and the protection ofprivacy.
* In sum, while we acknowledge the need for government participation, especially in educating
society about what is at stake, the government 's role in private sector infrastructure protection
should be limited and largely advisory. The private sector should set information security
standards, and the government should clearly define and limit what information it seeks from
businesses and how that information will be used.
The following important conclusions have been drawn through this thesis:
*
Technology has already been used by terrorist organizations in the past and will continue to be
used.
* There is ongoing development in the field of information technology by strategic planners to
use it both as an offensive weapon and as a weapon to cause an attack that would ditrupt the
infrastructure on which a nation depends.
* Information Technology has been effectively used by terrorist organizations to take advantage
over network form oforganization.
* Information Technology has been used in the past byAmerican forces in the GulfWar.
* Those countries most capable ofwaging an information warfare are the ones that are most
susceptible to such an attack.
* The globalization and digitization brought with the Information Revolution also brings us
closer to hostile elements of the societies such as terrorists.
* Cyber attacks are easy to carry out. It is relatively inexpensive,
can be carried out anonymously
completely deniable. In
addition to this, the fact that global economy solely depends upon the
flow of information through computer networks, makes information war the perfect andmost
attractive weapon to a terrorist.
* The security solutions
that we currently have lag far behind the potential threat (Yael, n.d.).
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